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IMMATERIAL LIES: CONDONING DECEIT IN 
THE NAME OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
Stefan J. Padfield† 
The message that pervades society is that it’s O.K. to lie—you 
can get away with it. One of the things I found in my research 
is that when you confront people with their lies, they very 
rarely display remorse. Lying is not seen as being morally 
reprehensible in any strong way.
1
 
If investor confidence is to come back . . . , the law must 
advance.
2
 
 
                                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. B.A., Brown 
University; J.D., The University of Kansas School of Law. An earlier version of this Article was 
presented at the 2009 Central States Law School Association Annual Conference held at Capital 
University Law School on October 23–24, 2009. My thanks to all the participants for their 
helpful comments. The ideas presented in this Article first appeared in shorter form in An 
Argument for Reduced Dependence on Materiality in Dismissing Frivolous Lawsuits, 2 J. SEC. 
L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 380 (2009). I would like to thank the publishers for all their support. 
Finally, I would like to thank The University of Akron School of Law for providing me with a 
summer research grant to help me complete this project. 
1 Eben Harrell, Why We Lie So Much, TIME (Aug. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1917215,00.html (quoting Robert Feldman, a 
professor of psychology at the University of Massachusetts, during a question and answer 
session regarding Feldman‘s most recent book, THE LIAR IN YOUR LIFE: HOW LIES WORK AND 
WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT OURSELVES). 
2 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 1383, at 5 (1934). Specifically, the quoted language is from 
―then-Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Representative 
Sam Rayburn, who sponsored the bill that eventually led to the passage of the 1934 [Securities] 
Exchange Act.‖ Elisse B. Walter, Comm‘r, Sec. Exch. Comm‘n, Speech at Northwestern 
University School of Law‘s Forty-eighth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute: U.S. SEC 
Comm‘r, SEC Rulemaking — ―Advancing the Law‖ to Protect Investors (Oct. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch100209ebw.htm. 
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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2008 is raising the issue of investor trust 
and confidence in the market once again. Investors are questioning 
how managers could have taken such significant risks in the 
subprime-lending and credit-default-swap markets without, 
apparently, providing adequate disclosure to the market. The pending 
flood of lawsuits following in the wake of this financial crisis provides 
an opportunity, however, for courts to restore some of this lost trust.  
This Article argues that one of the ways courts can do this is by 
curtailing their overdependence on using materiality as the basis for 
dismissing what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits under Rule 10b-5. 
There are at least four good reasons for doing so. First, condoning 
managerial misstatements on the basis of immateriality arguably has 
a negative impact on investor confidence because whenever courts 
find a misstatement to be immaterial as a matter of law they are 
effectively concluding that shareholders will receive no relief even 
where the statement was made with full knowledge of its falsity and 
with the requisite intent to defraud. Second, the materiality ―safety 
valve‖ doctrines that have evolved to assist courts in dismissing 
frivolous suits are often in direct conflict with Supreme Court 
guidance as to both the proper definition and analysis of materiality 
in the context of Rule 10b-5. Third, when the courts routinely 
categorize managerial misstatements as immaterial to dismiss 
frivolous suits, they create a tension with the disclosure rules, which 
are premised on ideals of full and fair disclosure and often turn on 
materiality determinations. Finally, dependence on materiality is 
unnecessary because other elements of Rule 10b-5, such as scienter, 
have been strengthened to the point where they allow courts to deal 
with frivolous suits without having to rule on materiality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 10b-5
3
 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
4
 is the primary 
vehicle for challenging alleged corporate securities fraud.
5
 In order to 
                                                                                                                 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
4 Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)). 
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make out a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that there was  
(1) a misrepresentation or actionable omission of fact, (2) that is 
material, (3) made with scienter, (4) in connection with the purchase 
or sale of security, (5) that was justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff, 
and (6) that proximately caused the plaintiff‘s loss.6 A fact is 
generally judged to be material in the context of securities regulation 
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in deciding whether to buy or sell a security.
7
 
Put another way, a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would have viewed the fact as significantly 
altering the total mix of information available.
8
 The Supreme Court 
has cautioned that materiality is a fact-intensive issue, rarely to be 
decided on a motion to dismiss.
9
  
Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson,
10
 which allowed class action plaintiffs to take advantage of 
a ―fraud on the market‖ presumption of reliance, the prospect of 
crippling damage awards skyrocketed.
11
 Concern soon mounted that 
the concomitant increase in the potential cost to corporations for 
failing to settle these suits would translate into an increase in the 
filing of frivolous ―strike suits.‖12 In response to this concern, courts 
began to look for various ―safety valves‖ to dismiss these claims.13 
                                                                                                                 
 
5 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2008) (―[F]ederal securities law has several express and implied causes 
of action based on misrepresentations. Perhaps the most important antifraud provision is Rule 
10b-5 . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). 
6 Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994). 
7 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality 
in the context of a proxy solicitation); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) 
(adopting the TSC definition of materiality in the context of a purchase or sale of a security).  
8 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
9 See id. at 450 (―Only if the established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an 
investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality‘ is the ultimate issue 
of materiality appropriately resolved ‗as a matter of law‘ by summary judgment.‖ (quoting 
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970))). 
10 485 U.S. at 250. 
11 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 (2009) (―Soon after Basic, the number of such suits rose dramatically, 
adding fuel to the political firestorm of securities class-action lawsuits and eventually leading 
Congress to enter the field with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
12 Another concern was that the costs would be borne by the very individuals allegedly 
harmed—the shareholders. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(―And who will pay the judgments won in such actions? I suspect that all too often the 
majority‘s rule will ‗lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, 
for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers.‘‖ (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 
F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring))). 
13 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 11, at 151 (―In the twenty years since the Supreme 
Court of the United States‘ decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, lower court decisions have 
 12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM 
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The focus of these safety valves was often the issue of materiality. 
Courts used doctrines such as: ―puffery,‖ ―bespeaks caution,‖ ―truth-
on-the-market,‖ and bright-line rules tied to the price movements of 
stock,
14
 to dismiss claims by concluding that the alleged 
misrepresentation or omission was immaterial as a matter of law. 
There are a number of problems, however, with overdependence 
on materiality safety valves. First, courts‘ repeated declarations that 
management is free to lie, so long as that lie is immaterial, arguably 
sends the message to executives that it is often okay to embellish the 
truth—and sends the message to investors that they should adopt an 
attitude of caveat emptor (―buyer beware‖) when it comes to the 
statements of corporate executives. One might argue that it is overly 
pejorative to characterize these disclosures as lies. However, when a 
court grounds dismissal on a finding of immateriality, it is effectively 
saying that there is no basis for liability even if it were proven that an 
executive misstated the facts with intent to deceive (i.e., there was a 
lie).
15
 Second, the safety valves themselves twist the definition of 
materiality to the point that they seemingly make a mockery of the 
Supreme Court‘s declarations on the issue. Finally, courts‘ excessive 
reliance on these safety valves creates a conflict with the disclosure 
rules, which often turn on determinations of materiality. Fortunately, 
there is a better way: focusing on the other elements of Rule 10b-5. 
With the financial crisis of 2008 raising the issue of investor trust 
and confidence in the market once again, investors are questioning 
how managers could have taken such significant risks in the subprime 
lending and credit default swap markets without apparently providing 
adequate disclosure to the market.
16
 The pending flood of lawsuits 
following in the wake of this financial crisis provides an opportunity, 
                                                                                                                 
 
insisted on proof of market efficiency, materiality, and loss causation more stringent than the 
Court‘s presumption of reliance seemingly requires.‖).  
14 See discussion infra Part II.E. 
15 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 799 (4th ed. 2002) 
(defining a lie as ―[a] false statement deliberately presented as being true . . . . Something meant 
to deceive or give a wrong impression.‖). 
16 See, e.g., SEC Charges Former Officers of Subprime Lender New Century with Fraud, 
SEC Litigation Release No. 21327 (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2009/lr21327.htm (―Defendants . . . failed to disclose important negative information, 
including dramatic increases in early loan defaults, loan repurchases, and pending loan 
repurchase requests.‖); SEC Files Securities Fraud Charges Against Former Countrywide 
Executives, SEC Litigation Release No. 21068A (June 4, 2009), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21068a.htm (―The SEC alleges that Mozilo, Sambol, and 
Sieracki actually knew, and acknowledged internally, that Countrywide was writing 
increasingly risky loans . . . . Despite these severe concerns about the increasing risks that 
Countrywide was undertaking, Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki hid these risks from the investing 
public.‖). 
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however, for courts to restore some of this lost trust by refusing to 
label lies immaterial unless absolutely necessary.
17
 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE ELEMENT OF MATERIALITY IN RULE 10B-5 
In this Part, I will briefly review the role of Rule 10b-5 in 
securities regulation generally, including its various elements. I will 
then focus on the definition of the critical element of materiality, 
including its fact-intensive nature and questions surrounding the 
status of the ―reasonable investor‖ whose judgment is deemed 
determinative. Finally, I will conclude this Part by reviewing the 
various materiality safety valves that have arisen to assist judges in 
dismissing what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits, including the 
doctrines of ―puffery,‖ ―bespeaks caution,‖ ―truth-on-the-market,‖ 
and bright-line price-movement rules. 
A. Securities Regulation and the Role of Rule 10b-5 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in 
relevant part that ―[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o 
use . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.‖18 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission pursuant to § 10(b), further provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.
19
 
―For more than twenty-five years, the primary private remedy for 
fraud available under the Securities Exchange Act has been the one 
implied from SEC Rule 10b-5.‖20 Justice Rehnquist has famously 
                                                                                                                 
17 Cf. Alison Smale, Leaders in Davos Admit Drop in Trust and Uncertainty Ahead, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A8 (―If there was one takeaway from the annual gathering of business 
and political leaders in Davos this year, it was this: trust in governments, corporations and above 
all banks has become as elusive as sure footing on the icy streets of this Alpine resort.‖).  
18 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting standing of private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 to purchasers and 
sellers). 
20 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4[1] 
(6th ed. 2009). There are meaningful distinctions between the use of Rule 10b-5 in 
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characterized the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 as 
―a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.‖21 While there is much debate, recent empirical work continues 
to suggest that this ―judicial oak‖ provides a net gain to society.22 
B. The Elements of Rule 10b-5 
In order to make out a claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must 
prove that there was ―1) a misstatement or omission 2) of material 
fact 3) occurring in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, 
that 4) was made with scienter and 5) upon which the plaintiff 
justifiably relied, 6) and that proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff.‖23 In the following pages, I will explore the concept of 
materiality in greater depth and hopefully demonstrate that it has been 
excessively and inappropriately relied upon in the rush to dismiss 
securities suits deemed to be unmeritorious. I will then explain how 
other elements of Rule 10b-5, like scienter and loss causation, are 
much better positioned, particularly in light of recent precedent, to 
carry the load when it comes to battling frivolous litigation. 
Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to pause briefly here to discuss 
one of the elements I do not address in greater depth later—the 
necessity of pleading a misstatement.
24
 
It is commonly said that there is no ―fraud by hindsight‖ under our 
securities laws.
25
 To that end, a complaint: 
must . . . ―indicate why the alleged misstatements would have 
been false or misleading at the several points in time in which 
                                                                                                                 
 
administrative, civil (public and private), and criminal actions. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Hell Hath No Fury Like an Investor Scorned: Retribution, Deterrence, Restoration, and the 
Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 3, 4–5 (2007) 
(discussing distinctions between civil and criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5). I will be 
focusing on the private civil context. 
21 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. 
22 See C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 
95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356 (2010) (―Our study suggests that securities litigation is an effective 
disciplining tool for institutional owners.‖); Brian Carson McTier & John K. Wald, The Causes 
and Consequences of Securities Class Action Litigation 1 (Apr. 23, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393857 (―Overall the results suggest 
that class action lawsuits drive firms to reduce overinvestment and increase focus.‖). 
23 Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994). 
24 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (―The language of § 10(b) 
gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or 
deception.‖). 
25 Cf. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 (2004) (―In the 
context of securities regulation, hindsight can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad 
outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers.‖). 
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it is alleged they were made.‖ Merely alleging ‗‗that 
defendants made statements ‗and then showing in hindsight 
that [they were] false‘‖ does not satisfy the [Private Securities 
Litigation] Reform Act.
26
  
Particularly in the case of litigation related to the subprime-lending 
crisis, failure to plead a misstatement may be a particularly viable 
basis for dismissal. However, this issue will turn on the contentious 
question of who knew what when.  
In his book How Markets Fail, John Cassidy makes a strong case 
against the proposition that no one knew trouble was brewing in the 
housing market before the crisis hit.
27
 He notes that ―[a]s early as 
2002, some commentators, [himself] included, were saying that in 
many parts of the country real estate values were losing touch with 
incomes.‖28 Furthermore, the assertion by key financial market 
players like Jamie Dimon, chief executive officer of J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., that ―we just missed that housing prices don‘t go up 
forever,‖ borders on the incredible.29 Nonetheless, failure to plead a 
misstatement should be a viable basis for dismissing frivolous suits in 
at least some cases, thereby precluding any need to rely on 
materiality. 
C. The Definition of Materiality 
Materiality has been described as a ―notoriously slippery concept, 
‗unpredictable and elusive‘ in application.‖30 Part of the problem is 
                                                                                                                 
26 In re MoneyGram Int‘l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 947, 973 (D. Minn. 2009) (first 
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079, 
1083 (8th Cir. 2005) and Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 2002)). Fraud by 
hindsight may also be relevant to the analysis of scienter. See id. at 981–83 (relying on 
combination of external ―red flags,‖ which alone would support only fraud-by-hindsight, and 
internal communications to find recklessness). 
27 JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES passim 
(2009); see also James Kwak, The Cover -Up, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Apr. 12, 2010, 9:59 
PM), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/04/12/magnetar-financial-crisis-cover-up/ (―[P]lenty of 
people saw the crisis coming. In late 2009, people like Nouriel Roubini and Peter Schiff were all 
over the airwaves for having predicted the crisis. Since then, there have been multiple books 
written about people who not only predicted the crisis but bet on it, making hundreds of millions 
or billions of dollars for themselves.‖). But see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Securities Litigation 
and the Housing Market Downturn, 35 J. CORP. L. 97, 119 (2009) (―[W]e conclude that the 
evidence is consistent with the proposition that the serious housing market downturn was not 
generally foreseen by sophisticated market participants prior to the fourth quarter of 2007.‖).  
28 CASSIDY, supra note 27, at 18. 
29 Jim Kuhnhenn & Daniel Wagner, Bankers Apologize for Actions That Led to Crisis, 
ABC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9547906. 
30 Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the 
Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 319 (2007) (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 
565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977)). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance 
in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2003) 
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that in application, the standard is supposed to strike an efficient 
balance between informing investors on the one hand, while not 
burying them in unnecessary information on the other. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Basic, ―certain information concerning 
corporate developments could well be of ‗dubious significance.‘‖31 It 
was important, the Court noted, that the standard for defining 
materiality was not set too low because ―a minimal standard 
might . . . lead management ‗simply to bury the shareholders in an 
avalanche of trivial information.‘‖32 On the other hand, in the very 
same opinion the Court firmly rejected the notion that investors 
should be spared the details of what goes on during premerger 
negotiations because they might not be able to discount the 
information properly. 
The . . . rationale . . . stands soundly rejected . . . . ―It assumes 
that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate—even when 
told—that mergers are risky propositions up until the 
closing.‖ Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of 
accurate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by 
Congress.
33
 
And the difficult line drawing is not limited to premerger 
negotiations or inside information about subprime exposure, but also 
includes issues like the health status of important corporate insiders. 
For example, is the health of Apple Inc.‘s Steve Jobs material to 
investors?
34
 
                                                                                                                 
 
(―The facial simplicity of the basic legal standard governing materiality masks the complexities 
encountered by transaction planners, litigants, the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘), 
and courts in interpreting and applying that standard.‖). 
31 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)). 
32 Id. (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448). 
33 Id. at 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
34 See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Joann S. Lublin, Apple Mum On Jobs’s Treatment, 
Diagnosis, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at B1 (―Apple and its directors have consistently kept a 
tight lid on Mr. Jobs‘s health, even though the CEO is regarded as key to the company‘s strategy 
and direction.‖); cf. id. (―In 1992, Steven J. Ross, who was then chairman and co-CEO of Time 
Warner Inc., died after a year-long battle with prostate cancer. The media giant said Mr. Ross 
was still running the show during much of that time. He actually was working from home only a 
few hours a day, a friend later said.‖). See generally Allan Horwich, When the Corporate 
Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corporation Obligated to Disclose That Illness and 
Should the Securities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & BUS. 827 (2009) (analyzing public corporations‘ legal obligations to disclose facts about 
the health of their ―luminary‖ employees); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About 
Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor 
Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 756–57 (2007) (arguing an executive's personal 
information may be material for purposes of securities regulation). It is important to note here 
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In the following Sections, I will explore the key aspects of the 
definition of materiality under Rule 10b-5. I will start with the basic 
definition set forth by the Supreme Court in its TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc.
35
 and Basic decisions. I will then take a closer look at 
the fact-intensive nature of the application of that definition, as well 
as questions surrounding the ―reasonable investor‖ whose perspective 
we are to take when applying the definition. 
1. The TSC/Basic Definitions 
In TSC Industries, the Supreme Court considered a claim of fraud 
in connection with a proxy solicitation under Rule 14a-9
36
 and 
concluded that ―[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important 
in deciding how to vote.‖37 Alternatively, the Court held that ―there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‗total mix‘ of information made available.‖38 
This standard was later carried over to the Rule 10b-5 context.
39
 
As discussed above, the Court rejected the view that ―all facts 
which a reasonable shareholder might consider important‖ were 
material for purposes of securities regulation.
40
 It did so because ―if 
the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low . . . the corporation 
and its management [may] be subjected to liability for insignificant 
omissions or misstatements, . . . [and this] may cause it simply to bury 
the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.‖41 On the 
other hand, the Court cautioned that satisfying one‘s burden as to 
                                                                                                                 
 
that silence, even when in possession of material information, does not create liability under the 
securities laws absent a duty to speak. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) 
(―[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction 
commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.‖).  
35 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
36 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010) (prohibiting certain false or misleading statements in 
connection with the solicitation of proxies).  
37 426 U.S. at 449. 
38 Id. Some courts have relied solely on the ―total mix‖ definition of materiality. 5C 
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:32 (2010) 
(collecting cases). 
39 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (―We now expressly adopt the 
TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.‖); cf. id. at 238 
(concluding that the definition of materiality in the context of speculative information or 
contingent events—like premerger negotiations—turned on a balancing of the probability and 
magnitude of the event).  
40 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445 (quoting Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 
330 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
41 Id. at 448. 
 12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM 
2010] IMMATERIAL LIES 153 
materiality ―does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable 
investor to change his vote.‖42 Rather, ―[w]hat the standard does 
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the 
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual 
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.‖43 
2. A Fact-Intensive Analysis 
The courts frequently utter a common refrain asserting that the 
analysis of materiality is extremely fact-intensive and thus is rarely to 
be decided on the basis of pretrial motions to dismiss or summary 
judgment. The Supreme Court itself has declared that ―[o]nly if the 
established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an investor, that 
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality‘ is the 
ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved ‗as a matter of 
law‘ by summary judgment.‖44 Nonetheless, courts frequently dismiss 
securities cases based on immateriality.
45
 As Professors Bainbridge 
and Gulati note, this result is, at first blush, puzzling: 
[I]f a high percentage of securities disclosure cases are 
dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage on grounds that the 
information in question was immaterial, but each opinion has 
in it the caveat that materiality is ordinarily an issue for the 
finder of fact, and it is only in the rare case that it can be 
decided at the motion to dismiss stage, things do begin to 
look suspicious.
46
 
                                                                                                                 
42 Id. at 449. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 450 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129–30 (4th Cir. 
1970)); see also id. (noting that materiality determinations are ―peculiarly ones for the trier of 
fact‖). 
45 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same 
Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 
EMORY L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002) (―Of the 91 (out of 100) cases that were decided at the motion 
to dismiss stage, 64 involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants (i.e., over 70 
percent.‖); David A. Hoffman, The ―Duty‖ To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
537, 542 (2006) (―In this Article, I present evidence that courts dismiss securities claims on the 
ground of presumed immateriality in half of opinions considering materiality.‖). But see 
Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class Actions: 
An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs 34 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 09-016 and N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457085 (listing materiality as 
fifth basis for dismissal in a review of Supreme Court securities class actions). As to the Choi & 
Pritchard study, it is worth noting that if one combines ―Forward Looking Safe Harbor,‖ 
―Materiality,‖ and ―Puffery‖ into one category, it ranks second behind only scienter. See id. 
46 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 115 (internal quotations omitted). 
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A possible answer to this puzzle is that courts use materiality 
determinations as a safety valve for frivolous litigation, which is only 
effective
47
 if the pressure is released pretrial. 
3. No Bright-Line Rules 
In addition to the admonition that materiality is largely a question 
of fact (though ultimately a mixed question of fact and law) rarely to 
be decided pretrial, the Supreme Court has also warned against the 
use of bright-line rules.
48
 Specifically, while the Supreme Court 
acknowledged, ―[a] bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a 
standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the 
circumstances,‖ it ultimately concluded that ―ease of application 
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts 
and Congress‘ policy decisions.‖49 Thus, ―[a]ny approach that 
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an 
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily 
be overinclusive or underinclusive.‖50 
Having briefly discussed the basic definition of materiality, as well 
as its fact-intensive nature and incompatibility with bright-line rules, I 
want to round out this initial exploration of the definition of 
materiality with an examination of the requirement that we take the 
perspective of the ―reasonable investor‖ in conducting an analysis of 
materiality under Rule 10b-5. Who is a ―reasonable investor‖ for 
purposes of materiality determinations? This is not at all clear. 
4. Who is the Reasonable Investor and Why Don’t  
We Ask Her What She Thinks?
51
 
The Wheat Report
52
 summarized the dilemma of defining the 
reasonable investor as follows: 
At what audience should disclosure be aimed? Is the literature 
elicited by the Commission‘s requirements intended primarily 
                                                                                                                 
47 See discussion infra Parts III.B.  
48 See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 (―The issue of materiality may be characterized as a 
mixed question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a 
particular set of facts.‖). 
49 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
50 Id. 
51 Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the 
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291 (2009) (discussing 
women as investors and whether the reasonable investor is a woman). 
52 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICIES UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS (The Wheat Report) (1969), available at 
http://sechistorical.org/museum/papers/1960. 
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to aid the unsophisticated? Is it, on the contrary, designed to 
assist the assiduous student of finance who searches for every 
clue to the intrinsic value of securities? Or should the 
Commission strive to meet the needs of a hypothetical 
―reasonable‖ investor of ―reasonable‖ sophistication? 
Throughout its history, the Commission has struggled with 
these questions. They may well be unanswerable.
53
 
More recently, I commented that a review of the cases revealed 
conceptions of the reasonable investor ―stretching from 
‗sophisticated‘ to ‗average‘ to ‗naïve.‘‖54 
It seems clear, as far as the SEC is concerned, that the reasonable 
investor, for purposes of materiality determinations, is the 
unsophisticated retail investor.
55
 As Donald Langevoort has noted: 
―The Securities and Exchange Commission thinks of itself as the 
investors‘ advocate, by which it means retail investors—individuals 
and households—as opposed to institutional investors.‖56 He goes on 
to point out that the ―history of rules, interpretations, and enforcement 
by the SEC is filled with references to both the need to promote retail-
level investor confidence to give depth and liquidity to the nation‘s 
financial markets and the desire to level the playing field between the 
meek and the privileged.‖57 This in spite of the fact that, ―[t]he last 
thirty years or so have brought a rapid shift toward institutionalization 
in the financial markets in the United States—in other words, a shift 
toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies, bank trust departments, and the like.‖58 Meanwhile, Joan 
MacLeod Heminway has noted that court cases ―indicate expressly or 
impliedly that the reasonable investor is a sophisticated trader, an 
experienced participant in securities markets who researches 
                                                                                                                 
53 Id. at 51–52; cf. Stanley Keller, Securities Act Reform, in 1 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1021, 1023 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2004) (―[A] Commission 
study chaired by Commissioner Francis Wheat . . . resulted in the Wheat Report published in 
1969 that recommended expanded periodic disclosure under the Exchange Act and coordination 
of the Securities Act and Exchange Act disclosure requirements.‖). 
54 Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. 
PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 365 (2008). 
55 See Stephen J. Crimmins, Investor Protection Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 11, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://blogs.law. 
harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/11/investor-protection-provisions-of-the-doddfrank-act/ (noting 
that the Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to study ―the level of financial literacy of retail 
investors, and what means might be most effective to further educate them‖).  
56 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009). 
57 Id. at 1025–26. 
58 Id. at 1026. 
 12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM 
156 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
investment prospects and has the ability to understand what the 
research reveals.‖59 
In response to this quandary, I have written previously that 
―[p]erhaps the best view, then, is that the term ‗reasonable investor‘ is 
meant simply to make the standard an objective one, excluding 
idiosyncratic investing decisions, rather than favoring a particular 
level of sophistication.‖60 This should not come as any surprise given 
my repeated criticism of the various materiality safety valves 
described herein. As Joan MacLeod Heminway has pointed out, ―[a] 
conception of the reasonable investor as sophisticated is the root of 
several key common law defenses to claims of materiality (‗mere 
puffery,‘ ‗truth-on-the-market,‘ and ‗bespeaks caution‘).‖61 Somewhat 
relatedly, David Hoffman has pointed out that to equate the 
reasonable investor with ―homo economicus‖ (my words, not his) for 
purposes of materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5 is to impose 
a ―duty‖ to be a rational shareholder—a duty that is ―novel in scope‖ 
and ―ungrounded in principle.‖62 Accordingly, I have also proposed 
elsewhere that if the materiality test really is intended to turn on the 
reactions of reasonable investors, then perhaps we should ask them 
directly what they deem material rather than engage in debate.
63
 
                                                                                                                 
59 Heminway, supra note 51, at 301. 
60 Padfield, supra note 54, at 345–46. An idea I have been toying with lately is the 
possibility of a ―target-group‖ standard. Cf. 3 HAZEN, supra note 20, at § 12.9[3][A] (―When a 
defendant targets unreasonably naive or careless investors, the more objective reasonable person 
standard will not preclude a finding of materiality.‖). See generally John M. Newman, Jr. et al., 
Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the 
―Misleading‖ and ―Materiality‖ Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571, 572 
(1995) (arguing that the ―reasonable investor‖ should be replaced by the ―professional investor‖ 
for purposes of determining materiality in fraud-on-the-market claims because those are the 
investors that impact efficient market prices). I believe such a standard would differ from 
Margaret Sachs‘s ―least sophisticated‖ standard in that it would allow for a ―highly 
sophisticated‖ standard in connection with appropriate transactions. See Margaret V. Sachs, 
Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing ―the Reasonable Investor‖ with ―the 
Least Sophisticated Investor‖ in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473 (2007) (arguing for 
the adoption of a lower materiality standard in inefficient markets, which could be 
counterbalanced by the adoption of a higher scienter standard). 
61 Heminway, supra note 51, at 302. 
62 Hoffman, supra note 45, at 538 (―Courts require investors to investigate their 
purchases, to coldly process risk, to disregard oral statements of optimism, and in general to be 
economically rational. If investors fail to meet these expectations, judges deny them the 
protection of the securities laws. In this way, courts impose on public securities investors a 
special kind of legal duty, novel in scope and, I will argue, ungrounded in principle.‖). 
63 See Padfield, supra note 54, at 362–63 (―The legislative and judicial developments of 
federal securities laws and regulations are similar to those of Lanham Act false advertising 
law. . . . The significance of this relationship for our purposes is that it begs the question of why 
survey evidence is an accepted part of the evidentiary makeup of a Lanham Act case, 
particularly as to the issue of materiality, but not securities regulation cases.‖); cf. Crimmins, 
supra note 55 (―The SEC will be able to engage in ‗investor testing programs‘ and other 
initiatives to gather information from investors [under the Dodd-Frank Act].‖). 
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So what is the point of all this? Well, if one perceives the courts‘ 
materiality determinations to be unduly restricting the definition of 
―reasonable investor‖ in this context, then a shift of focus onto other 
elements of Rule 10b-5 to dismiss frivolous suits may be appropriate. 
Even if one is unsure as to the proper definition of the reasonable 
investor for these purposes, the conclusion is the same if one prefers 
that legislatures and administrative bodies with relevant expertise 
define this sort of concept rather than courts. Only if one agrees with 
a narrow definition of the reasonable investor and believes judges are 
the proper dispensers of that judgment, should one support the court‘s 
continued routine dependence on materiality as grounds for dismissal. 
But even then, I will argue further that there are other good reasons 
why one might nevertheless want judges to avoid depending on 
materiality to dismiss frivolous suits if at all possible.  
D. The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption and ―Frivolous‖  
Litigation as the Greatest Threat to Our Economy 
In Basic, the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance and unleashed, at least according to much of 
the business community, a flood of unmeritorious securities litigation. 
This litigation was premised on the notion that the potential for 
catastrophic damages generated by the large classes of plaintiffs now 
capable of being formed would force companies to settle cases rather 
than risk their assets at trial.
64
 These concerns continue to this day, 
and recent legislative responses include enactment of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
65
 (the ―PSLRA‖) and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
66
 (the 
―SLUSA‖). The PSLRA imposed higher procedural hurdles on filing 
for federal securities fraud class actions than existed for any other 
type of private litigation.
67
 Meanwhile, the SLUSA ―significantly 
limit[ed] the ability of plaintiff-investors to seek redress for securities 
fraud under state law and through the state courts.‖68 I will spend 
                                                                                                                 
64 See, e.g., Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 809 (2009) (―As a result of the Basic 
presumption . . . securities fraud class actions increased in number.‖). 
65 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
66 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified primarily in 15 U.S.C. § 77p and 
18 U.S.C. § 78bb). 
67 See Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141, 144–48 (1999) (discussing how the PSLRA 
changed the pleading standards for scienter and fraud). 
68 Id. at 142. 
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more time fleshing out the heightened pleading standards of the 
PSLRA later in this Article.
69
 
The legitimacy of all the wailing and gnashing of teeth regarding 
frivolous litigation is hotly debated.
70
 Donald Langevoort has 
commented, ―[a]s the noted securities law scholar Joel Seligman 
pointed out at the time and subsequent research seems to have 
confirmed, there probably is a stronger correlation between the merits 
and both the filing and settlement of these actions than critics have 
claimed.‖71 Meanwhile, Barbara Black has argued, ―the post-PSLRA 
securities fraud class action is reasonably effective in achieving both 
compensatory and deterrence goals.‖72 Regardless of what one may 
think of the merits of the various arguments surrounding frivolous 
securities litigation post-Basic, it would be difficult to deny that 
judges and courts jumped into the fray feet first, and their favorite 
tool for combating frivolous suits was often materiality. 
E. The Evolution of Materiality ―Safety Valves‖ 
Professors Bainbridge and Gulati have said the following about 
what I call ―safety valves‖ and they have called judicial ―rules of 
thumb,‖ that is ―decisionmaking heuristics or shortcuts‖: 
[T]he heuristics we identify are substantive law doctrinal 
rules of thumb enabling a judge to avoid analysis of a case‘s 
full complexities. . . . [They] not only become doctrine but 
can come to dominate the ongoing evolution of substantive 
law. . . . [T]he real puzzle is that federal judges are 
                                                                                                                 
69 See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
70 See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Overturning Stoneridge and the Symbolic Passing of an Era, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/ 
shareholder-rights/overturning-stoneridge-and-the-symbolic-passing-of-an-era.html (―In the last 
years of the Bush administration, the growing tenor was that securities litigation was harming 
markets in the United States. Superficial analysis asserted that litigation was responsible for any 
number of ills, including the decline in foreign listings on the NYSE. It was never a particularly 
well reasoned approach (which is not to say that there are not problems with litigation that ought 
to be addressed) and was often tendentious in its call for reforms.‖ (omitted emphasis in 
original)). 
71 Langevoort, supra note 11, at 155 (citing Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A 
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s ―Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,‖ 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 444–49 (1994)). See 
generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1466 (2004) (discussing ―the American experience with securities class actions‖). But see 
Langevoort, supra note 11, at 155 (―Even if we agree that a large percentage of fraud-on-the-
market suits are based on at least plausible suspicions rather than imaginary factual claims, 
however, there is another cause for concern: the possibility that issuer damage liability may be 
disproportionate to the underlying conduct, particularly in a setting in which liability standards 
are severely indeterminate.‖). 
72 Black, supra note 64, at 806. 
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claiming—at least implicitly—a level of expertise about the 
workings of markets and organizations that, in some areas, 
not even the most sophisticated researchers in financial 
economics and organizational theory have reached.
73
  
Before engaging in a discussion of the particular materiality safety 
valves, I want to pause here to address the notion that judges and 
courts should have more freedom to practice policymaking from the 
bench in private actions arising under Rule 10b-5, than in other 
settings, because the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is 
judicially implied. Indeed, and as quoted above, Justice Rehnquist 
famously described the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 as ―a 
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.‖74 A.C. Pritchard has noted that Justice Powell ―considered the 
judge-made remedy under Rule 10b-5 to be a species of federal 
common law, and thus appropriate for judges to consider policy in 
defining its limits.‖75 
On the other hand, Donald Langevoort has noted that the Supreme 
Court rejected precisely such a policy-driven analysis of materiality in 
Basic:  
A more serious policy—the one that [Judge] Easterbrook had 
emphasized—was the need to preserve some zone of secrecy 
for merger negotiations that generally work to benefit 
investors. But the Court asked what this had to do with 
materiality. Materiality is not supposed to carry the baggage 
of policy design but simply ask about the significance of what 
is misrepresented or concealed.
76
 
I would simply submit that even if judges and courts have some 
greater freedom to make policy from the bench in private actions 
arising under Rule 10b-5 than in other contexts, then let them say that 
is what they are doing—rather than hiding behind interpretations of 
                                                                                                                 
73 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 83–84. 
74 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
75 A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 865 (2003). 
76 Donald C. Langevoort, Investor Protection and the Perils of Corporate Publicity: Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 257, 263 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 
2008); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234–35 (―[T]he importance of secrecy 
during the early stages of merger discussions, also seems irrelevant to an assessment whether 
their existence is significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor. . . . The ‗secrecy‘ 
rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality.‖). 
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materiality that at times sound like they sprang from the lips of 
Humpty Dumpty.
77
 
Thus, allow me to expressly state what I hope is the obvious theme 
running through this Article: While there may have been a time when 
it was appropriate to rely on materiality as a safety valve to prevent 
the excess buildup of frivolous litigation, that time has passed. We 
now have better alternatives that allow us to continue our vigilance 
against strike suits without doing the damage we have arguably done 
previously to the concept of materiality specifically and, in the 
process, investor confidence generally. In that vein, I believe it 
appropriate to revive a quote from former SEC Chairman Manuel F. 
Cohen, which—while issued over forty years ago—rings particularly 
true in this context: ―[W]e cannot always rely on past solutions as we 
approach current or developing problems. Nor can we assume that 
methods which were entirely proper, even praiseworthy, at an earlier 
time are necessarily beneficial in a changed environment.‖78 
At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that the other elements 
of Rule 10b-5 do not suffer from their own doctrinal controversies. In 
fact, I am quite likely to critique the application of those other 
elements in future writing projects, and I try to point out at least some 
of the issues surrounding those other elements in this Article. Nor am 
I to be understood to be urging abdication of the responsibility of 
courts to clean up the materiality doctrine ―mess‖ I describe herein. 
Rather, what I am saying is that there should be enough cases where 
dismissal on the basis of failure to satisfy some other element of Rule 
10b-5 rather than materiality, like scienter, would be much less 
controversial, and do much less harm in terms of investor trust and 
confidence, than continuing to stretch the definition of materiality. 
This is particularly so where courts are tempted, for whatever reason, 
to dismiss cases on the basis of both materiality and some other 
element of Rule 10b-5.  
I will now provide a brief overview of the various materiality 
safety-valve doctrines, followed by a discussion of why these 
doctrines are problematic and courts no longer need to depend on 
them.  
                                                                                                                 
77 See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
66 (1983) (―‗When I use a word,‘ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‗it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.‘‖). 
78 Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Address Before the 
Investment Bankers Association of America (Nov. 30, 1965), quoted in Milton H. Cohen, 
―Truth in Securities‖ Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340 (1966). 
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1. Puffery 
The puffery doctrine can be found in a variety of areas of the law, 
including: mail fraud, securities fraud, common-law fraud, legal 
ethics, common-law contracts, Uniform Commercial Code warranty 
cases, promissory misrepresentation, [and] false advertising.
79
 It 
generally seeks to protect sellers from liability for mere ―sales talk.‖80 
As early as 1887, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts asserted that 
―[t]he law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the 
value and qualities of the articles which they have to sell. All men 
know this, and a buyer has no right to rely upon such statements.‖81  
An example of use of the puffery doctrine in the securities 
litigation context can be found in the 2006 Seventh Circuit opinion in 
the case of Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.
82
 In Tellabs, 
the court used the doctrine to immunize managerial statements 
asserting that product demand was ―exceeding [their] expectations‖ 
and the company felt ―very, very good about the robust growth [it 
was] experiencing.‖83 The court concluded: ―[t]his is precisely the 
type of statement that the marketplace views as pure hype, and 
accordingly discounts entirely,‖ and dismissed the claims.84 However, 
in an informal survey, sixty-two percent of investors found that the 
first statement was material and thirty-three percent found that the 
second statement was material.
85
 It is important to note, in reflecting 
on these numbers, that when a court dismisses a case based on 
immateriality, it is effectively saying that it has concluded, as a matter 
of law, that zero percent of reasonable investors would consider the 
statement material.
86
 
                                                                                                                 
79 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1396–97 
(2006) (footnotes omitted).  
80 Jennifer O‘Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the 
Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1698 (1998); see 
also Hoffman, supra note 79, at 1441–42 (describing the ―puffery paradox,‖ as one where 
―[s]ellers increasingly rely on persuasive, puffing, speech, but are protected from liability 
because such speech is assumed not to work‖).  
81 Kimball v. Bangs, 11 N.E. 113, 114 (Mass. 1887). 
82 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
83 Id. at 597 (internal quotations omitted). 
84 Id. at 598 (citing In re Allaire Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D. Mass. 
2002)). 
85 Padfield, supra note 54, at 368. 
86 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (―Only if the 
established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the question of materiality‘ is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved 
‗as a matter of law‘ by summary judgment.‖ (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 
1124, 1129–30 (4th Cir. 1970))). 
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2. Bespeaks Caution and the PSLRA 
―[U]nder the ‗bespeaks caution‘ doctrine, the presence of 
meaningful cautionary language can preclude a finding that investors 
were misled by projections or other forward-looking statements.‖87 
The bespeaks-caution doctrine was codified in section 21E of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as part of the PSLRA.
88
 Of 
particular relevance here, given the focus on the impropriety of 
sanctioning ―immaterial lies,‖ is the fact that the legislative 
formulation of the bespeaks-caution doctrine facially immunizes 
knowingly false statements made with an intent to deceive.
89
  
At least some courts have avoided this seemingly unpalatable 
result by concluding that any cautionary language provided in such a 
context could not be meaningful. For example, the district court in In 
re Nash Finch Co.,
90
 concluded that ―cautionary language can not be 
‗meaningful‘ when defendants know that the potential risks they have 
identified have in fact already occurred, and that the positive 
statements they are making are false.‖91 But, as other courts have 
held, this conclusion is arguably contrary to the express terms of the 
statute. For example, the court in In re Humana, Inc. Securities 
Litigation,
92
 endorsed the literal reading of the statute when it held 
that ―Plaintiffs‘ allegation that the Defendants had actual knowledge 
of the internal control problems ‗does not save the claim because the 
                                                                                                                 
87 Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures That 
Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 935 (2007); see also In re 
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[W]hen an offering 
document‘s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if 
those statements did not affect the ‗total mix‘ of information the document provided investors. 
In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or 
misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.‖). But see Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 
F.3d 758, 772 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the defendant‘s statement that ―potential 
deterioration in the high-yield sector . . . could result in further losses in AEFA‘s portfolio‖ was 
too vague to constitute meaningful cautionary language) (alteration in original). 
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (setting forth the requirement that the 
forward-looking statement be ―accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements‖ in order to 
receive the protections of the safe harbor); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006) (codifying a 
parallel provision under the Securities Act of 1933). 
89 Cf. Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements: 
An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge or Falsity Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary 
Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 520 (2010) (―[A]ctual knowledge of the weaknesses in a 
projection, including lack of a good faith belief in the projection, is not relevant to reliance on 
the meaningful cautionary statement safe harbor.‖).  
90 502 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D. Minn. 2007). 
91 Id. at 873; see also Asher v. Baxter Int‘l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that cautionary language would not be effective if the issuer intentionally omitted 
important risk factors). 
92 No. 3:08CV-00162-JHM, 2009 WL 1767193 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2009). 
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existence of the meaningful cautionary statement renders the issuer‘s 
state of mind irrelevant.‘‖93 
3. Truth on the Market and the Simple-Math Rule 
The truth-on-the-market defense has its roots in the ―total mix‖ 
definition of materiality. As Peter Huang describes it, ―the truth-on-
the-market defense argues that an issuer‘s statements or omissions 
cannot be misleading if there already is countervailing information, 
such as analysts‘ reports, in the public domain that is therefore part of 
the ‗total mix‘ of information that is available.‖94 This defense has 
particular relevance to ongoing subprime-crisis litigation. One of the 
primary arguments of defendants in these cases is that either (1) no 
one knew there was a problem until it was too late, or (2) to the extent 
people knew there was a problem, that information was public 
knowledge and so a particular defendant‘s failure to disclose this 
information was immaterial.  
This approach has already reaped dividends. For example, the 
court in Landmen Partners Inc. v. Blackstone Group, L.P.,
95
 
concluded that ―to the extent that Plaintiff alleges Blackstone should 
have disclosed the conditions of the [real estate] market generally, 
such omissions are not actionable. ‗Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not 
require the disclosure of publicly available information.‘‖96 
Apparently, the fact that one of Blackstone‘s four business segments 
was real estate and described itself on March 22, 2007, as seeing 
―‗high levels of growth‘ in the real estate industry and ‗strong 
investor demand for real estate assets‘‖97 was not a problem because, 
for example, home builder DR Horton had publicly announced on 
March 8 that 2007 ―is going to suck.‖98 One can certainly wonder 
whether issuer statements do not take on even more materiality when 
they come at a time of market uncertainty.
99
 
A variant of the truth-on-the-market doctrine that I have written 
about previously is what I call the ―simple math‖ rule.100 The simple-
                                                                                                                 
93 Id. at *15 (quoting Beaver Cnty. Ret. Bd. v. LCA-Vision Inc., No. 1:07-CV-750, 2009 
WL 806714, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009)). 
94 Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of 
Information and the Reasonableness of Investor, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99. 118 (2005). 
95 659 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
96 Id. at 545 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 243, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
97 Id. at 538 (quoting Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. ¶ 88). 
98 Bleak Housing Outlook for US Firm, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2007), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/business/6429815.stm. 
99 Cf. CASSIDY, supra note 27, at 18 (describing battle of experts regarding subprime 
risks in buildup to crisis). 
100 See Padfield, supra note 87, at 928 (defining the simple-math rule); cf. Hoffman, supra 
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math rule states that even if an issuer has not disclosed a particular 
fact, that omission will be deemed immaterial if the information 
necessary to deduce that fact has been disclosed. In other words, 
―[t]he courts have generally agreed that readers can put two and two 
together, and make somewhat more elaborate calculations or 
comparisons.‖101 A negative correlate of the simple-math rule is the 
―buried-facts‖ doctrine, which states, ―a disclosure is deemed 
inadequate if it is presented in a way that conceals or obscures the 
information sought to be disclosed.‖102 For example, ―[t]he doctrine 
applies when the fact in question is hidden in a voluminous document 
or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion which prevents a reasonable 
shareholder from realizing the ‗correlation and overall import of the 
various facts interspersed throughout‘ the document.‖103 As I noted in 
an earlier piece, not all applications of the simple-math rule leave one 
convinced that ―material omission‖ has a common understanding: 
Werner v. Werner . . . held that failure to disclose the 
magnitude of the gain flowing to interested directors in 
connection with a transaction they were recommending to 
shareholders was immaterial because shareholders could 
calculate that magnitude by: (1) recognizing that a planned 
removal of a right of first refusal under an equity incentive 
plan, as set forth in the relevant 1997 proxy statement, would 
benefit management; (2) then looking ―to the 1993 and 1994 
annual reports to determine how many shares were issued 
each year pursuant to the Restricted Stock Plan‖; (3) then 
using those same reports to ―determine the approximate fair 
market value (‗FMV‘) of Restricted shares at the date of 
issuance‖; (4) then employing the equation ―[(FMV 1997- 
FMV in 1993) x number of shares issued in 1993] + [(FMV 
1997- FMV 1994) x number of shares issued in 1994]‖ in 
order to ―compute the amount of money the management 
defendants would have gotten for their shares had the right of 
first refusal been exercised‖; and then finally, (5) comparing 
―the amount yielded by the above equation to the $66 million 
                                                                                                                 
 
note 45, at 581–82 (describing the truth-the-on-market doctrine as the ―‗understand 
consequences‘ technique‖). 
101 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, 2 Bromberg & LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 5:237 (2d ed. 2010). 
102 Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001). 
103 Id. (quoting Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
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the management defendants would actually receive in the 
Recapitalization as proposed.‖104 
I noted in conclusion that ―[a]t least some would agree that this 
labyrinth-like disclosure of a material fact is not consistent with a 
philosophy of full and fair disclosure.‖105 
4. Bright-Line Price-Movement Rules 
Finally, some courts espouse the view that ―[b]ecause in an 
efficient market ‗the concept of materiality translates into information 
that alters the price of the firm‘s stock,‘ if a company‘s disclosure of 
information has no effect on stock prices, ‗it follows that the 
information disclosed . . . was immaterial as a matter of law.‘‖106 
Other courts, while recognizing that stock price movement may be a 
strong indicator of materiality, do not limit themselves in this way.
107
 
For example, the court in Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, 
Inc.,
108
 held that ―hindsight is of limited value and the fact that 
ultimate disclosure of the [information] affected [the] stock price is 
not compelling.‖109  
III. THE PROBLEM OF OVERDEPENDENCE ON MATERIALITY 
Having laid the foundation for a deeper discussion of the problems 
created by an overdependence on materiality as a judicial safety valve 
for frivolous suits, we turn now to a discussion of those problems. 
The three primary arguments are that (1) when courts dismiss on 
materiality grounds they are immunizing lying; (2) the materiality 
safety valves are in conflict with the purposes of our securities 
regulation regime and Supreme Court precedence; and, (3) excessive 
characterization of disclosures as immaterial creates conflicts with the 
SEC‘s disclosure regime.  
                                                                                                                 
104 Padfield, supra note 87, at 943–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Werner, 267 F.3d at 
299–300). 
105 Id. at 944 (footnote omitted). It is also arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s 
admonition that ―not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive.‖ Va. Bankshares, 
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991). 
106 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d. 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (omission in original) (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
107 See, e.g., No. 84 Emp‘r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding 
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled 
materiality even where the relevant disclosure had no immediate effect on stock price). 
108 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983). 
109 Id. at 13. 
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A. When Courts Dismiss on Materiality Grounds  
They Are Immunizing Lies 
Should management be free to lie to investors with the intent to 
deceive them?
110
 Every time a court dismisses a Rule 10b-5 claim for 
lack of materiality, it is effectively answering that question in the 
affirmative. This is so because materiality is a necessary element of a 
Rule 10b-5 claim and its absence thus destroys the claim regardless of 
a plaintiff‘s ability to carry his or her burden on the other elements. In 
fact, one could argue that in order for dismissal on the basis of 
immateriality to have any real meaning the court must assume the 
other elements—like falsity and intent to deceive—are satisfied when 
reaching its conclusion. This practice alone should reduce the 
frequency of dismissals based on immateriality because assuming the 
matter is important enough for management to lie about inherently 
suggests materiality.
111
 As the Supreme Court has noted in a related 
context: 
Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge and 
expertness far exceeding the normal investor‘s resources, and 
the directors‘ perceived superiority is magnified even further 
by the common knowledge that state law customarily obliges 
them to exercise their judgment in the shareholders‘ interest. 
Naturally, then, the shareowner faced with a proxy request 
will think it important to know the directors‘ beliefs about the 
course they recommend and their specific reasons for urging 
the stockholders to embrace it.
112
  
Indeed, some courts in the past have suggested, ―any false 
statement or omission by company management, if intentional, should 
be considered material because it reveals a lack of management 
integrity that is presumably important to investors.‖113 But the general 
                                                                                                                 
110 Cf. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10–11 (Del. 1998) (―The directors‘ fiduciary duties 
include the duty to deal with their stockholders honestly. Shareholders are entitled to rely upon 
the truthfulness of all information disseminated to them by the directors they elect to manage the 
corporate enterprise.‖). 
111 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968) (―[A] major factor 
in determining whether . . . [there is] a material fact is the importance attached to . . . [it] by 
those who knew about it.‖).  
112 Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (citation omitted).  
113 Sauer, supra note 30, at 332; see also Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 
829–30 (8th Cir. 2003); Talma Trust v. Molex, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 960, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2006); 
cf. Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 169, 172, 175 
(2009) (asking whether investors can ―recover damages resulting from declines in the stock 
price attributable to the market‘s reassessment of the integrity of management‖ and concluding 
that ―there is no basis in law or policy for denying plaintiffs recovery for reputational 
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rule, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that: ―It is not enough that a 
statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is 
otherwise insignificant.‖114 Nonetheless, the concept of immunizing 
lies, particularly on the part of corporate management, raises 
troubling issues in these difficult times. 
Trust is a critical, if not the critical, ingredient to the success 
of the capital markets (and of the free market economy in 
general). . . . From the inception of federal securities 
legislation in the 1930s, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
to the policies under consideration in Washington, D.C., 
today, it has long been understood that in the face of 
economic calamity, the restoration and/or preservation of 
trust—especially investor trust—in our financial institutions 
and markets has been paramount. 
And if further proof of the indispensability of trust was 
needed, it has been forcefully provided by the financial 
services industry crisis and the unusually strong recession 
currently afflicting much of the globe throughout 2008–2009. 
By most accounts, a breach of trust—in the form of fairly 
reckless risk-taking by some, and in the form of dereliction of 
duty by others—has precipitated the crisis and, indirectly, the 
recession. And the lack of trust that these breaches 
engendered has figured prominently in the persistence of our 
economic woes (from banks fearful of lending, to investors 
fleeing the capital markets).
115
 
                                                                                                                 
 
damages‖). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: 
An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1091 (1990) 
(―[M]anagement should be allowed to deny rumors which it knows to be correct and even to 
make affirmative misstatements if doing so is necessary to protect aggregate share value.‖). 
114 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238; see also Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 
392 F.3d 650, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (―[N]ot all lies are actionable; the securities laws are only 
concerned with lies about material facts.‖). 
115 Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript at 3) (footnotes omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481327; see 
also Lynn A. Stout, Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets 1 (UCLA 
Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-15, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442023 (―[M]any investors rely on trust. Indeed, trust may be 
essential to a well-developed securities market. . . . When trust is not met by trustworthiness but 
instead is abused, trust tends to disappear. These lessons carry significant implications for our 
understanding of modern securities markets.‖); cf. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: 
Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 115, 115 (2009) (―Consumers and investors simply cannot trust the existing disclosure 
regime to provide reliable information necessary to monitor CSR [Corporate Social 
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In light of this, we may rightly be concerned when our courts 
routinely immunize lying in the name of securities regulation.
116
 As 
Donald Langevoort has said, the Supreme Court in Basic ―was not 
persuaded . . . that making life easier for lawyers or business people 
was as important a value as the pursuit of truth.‖117 
Ultimately, my argument here is tempered by the fact that I am not 
trying to convince judges deciding a Rule 10b-5 claim never to 
dismiss on the basis of immateriality, but rather to consider the 
implications of such a dismissal fully and rely on other grounds where 
sufficient, so as to avoid the problems I describe herein.
118
 
B. The ―Safety Valve‖ Materiality Doctrines Are in Conflict  
with the Purposes of Our Securities Regulation Regime 
 and Supreme Court Guidance 
As discussed above, the primary ―safety valves‖ involving 
materiality include the puffery, bespeaks-caution, truth-on-the-
market, and price-movement doctrines. This subsection will first 
examine problems associated with the puffery doctrine in detail, 
followed by a shorter examination of problems associated with the 
other three doctrines. 
1. Puffery 
There are numerous criticisms of the puffery doctrine. For 
purposes of this Article, I have grouped these criticisms into four 
―challenges.‖ First, the challenge presented by the findings of 
behavioral economics, which demonstrate that individuals are more 
susceptible to puffery than the doctrine asserts. Second, the challenge 
presented by the fact that protection of puffery is firmly rooted in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Responsibility] compliance. That lack of trust will cause the market for CSR to collapse, as 
consumers and investors stop offering rewards for responsible business behavior.‖). But cf. 
Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation (May 14, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1608115 (―[T]rust is 
complicated, existing in a variety of forms. Some forms, predicated primarily upon reasoned 
calculation, respond well to law and regulation. But other forms, predicated primarily upon 
relationship and emotion, respond poorly to law and regulation.‖). 
116 Cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify 
Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998, 1003 (2009) (―[J]udicial review can 
serve as government insurance by relieving employers of liability for socially undesirable 
conduct. . . . [C]ourts create moral hazard by vacating a high percentage of employee wins at 
arbitration.‖). 
117 Langevoort, supra note 76, at 269. 
118 Cf. United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (―[A]n animating purpose of 
the Exchange Act[ is] to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor 
confidence.‖). 
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doctrine of caveat emptor—a doctrine expressly rejected by our 
current system of securities regulation. Third, the challenge presented 
by the fact that when statements are analyzed in isolation in order to 
determine whether they constitute ―puffing,‖ the total-mix aspect of 
the materiality definition is ignored. Finally, the challenge presented 
by market realities. This last challenge is nicely summed up by David 
Hoffman in his description of the ―unwholesome‖ puffery paradox, 
whereby ―[s]ellers increasingly rely on persuasive, puffing, speech, 
but are protected from liability because such speech is assumed not to 
work.‖119  
a) Behavioral Economics 
Professor Langevoort has cogently asked: ―Is it clear that typical 
investors do not rely on puffery? There is little research that studies 
this specifically, and so many judges are guessing.‖120 In a previous 
article, I tried to shed some light on this question by surveying a 
group of investors to determine their responses to statements deemed 
immaterial puffery by courts.
121
 The survey results showed that 
―while the judges in the four surveyed cases concluded that no 
reasonable investor could find the statements challenged therein to be 
material because they constituted non-actionable puffery, between 
33% and 84% of reasonable investors surveyed deemed the 
statements material.‖122  
These results are consistent with at least some of the findings of 
behavioral economics.
123
 As Peter Huang has explained, ―[r]ecent 
research in psychology and the neurosciences reveals that humans 
comprehend and face risk utilizing two fundamental systems, one 
analytic and the other experiential.‖124 Huang goes on to define what 
he calls ―moody investing‖ as ―investing that is (at least, partially) 
non-cognitive.‖125 He then concludes, ―[m]oody investing means that 
the puffery defense is flawed because vague, promotional, or 
                                                                                                                 
119 Hoffman, supra note 79, at 1441–42.  
120 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 184 (2002). 
121 See Padfield, supra note 54, at 340–41. 
122 Id. at 341. 
123 See generally Hoffman, supra note 45, at 545–62 (reviewing the implications of 
behavioral law and economics for materiality determinations in securities regulation cases). 
124 Huang, supra note 94, at 102; see also Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as 
Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311 
(2004) (exploring the proper integration of the analytic and experimental systems in rational 
decision making); Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions that Involve Risk: A Dual-
Process Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 60 (2004) (describing a new 
approach to dual-process reasoning, called the ―fuzzy-trace theory‖). 
125 Huang, supra note 94, at 102–03.  
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hyperbolic statements can have real impacts on moods and therefore 
should not be deemed immaterial as a matter of law.‖126 
Clearly, not everyone is jumping on the behavioral economics 
bandwagon.
127
 Stephen Bainbridge notes that ―the relevant question to 
ask about the assumptions of a theory is not whether they are 
descriptively realistic, for they never are, but whether they are 
sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand,‖ and ―[t]he 
extent to which behavioral economics calls into question more 
traditional modes of economic analysis remains sharply contested.‖128 
Professor Bainbridge does acknowledge, however, that ―[a]t the very 
least . . . it seems clear that attention must be paid to the possibility 
that behavioral analysis sheds light on policy issues.‖129 Nonetheless, 
Ivan Preston noted in 1998, ―no behavioral studies have reported the 
finding, assumed by the law, that consumers typically see puffery or 
other loophole claims as meaningless.‖130 I am not aware of any 
studies having been conducted in the interim to seriously challenge 
that conclusion. 
b) The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor 
The historical basis of the puffery defense is rooted in the doctrine 
of caveat emptor. As Richard J. Leighton describes it, ―[t]he puffing 
defense is one of the few remaining vestiges, if not the only one, of 
the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor (‗let the buyer beware‘).‖131 
However, the doctrine of caveat emptor is diametrically opposed to 
the doctrine of full and fair disclosure underlying our securities 
regime. As the Supreme Court noted in SEC v. Capital Gains 
                                                                                                                 
126 Id. at 115. 
127 See, e.g., Darian Ibrahim, Rational Choice or Behavioral Law and Economics?, THE 
CONGLOMERATE (Sep. 4, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/09/rational-choice-or-
behavioral-law-and-economics.html (―The behavioral camp has much to offer. But several 
observations made by others persuade me not to dip my toes too deep into the behavioral 
waters.‖). 
128 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure and Securities Regulation: A Behavioral 
Analysis, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.professorbain 
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/mandatory-disclosure-and-securities-regulation-a-
behavioral-analysis.html. 
129 Id. 
130 Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other ―Loophole‖ Claims: How the Law’s ―Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell‖ Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 82–83 
(1998). Cf. id. at 81 (―Rotfeld & Rotzoll showed five ads containing 13 puffing claims to 100 
subjects, who 80.5 percent of the time reported these claims to be conveyed to them. The same 
research asked about 17 fact claims that might be implied by the puffery claims. While the law‘s 
assumption, as with the Bruskin research, is that such perceptions do not occur, the subjects saw 
the puff-implied fact claims conveyed 44.7 percent of the time.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
131 Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in Lanham Act False Advertising 
Cases: Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 615, 
637 (2005).  
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Research Bureau, Inc.,
132
 ―[a] fundamental purpose, common to the 
[‘33 and ‘34 Act], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for 
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry.‖133 In fact, Justice Powell 
referred to puffery as one of the evils the ‘33 Act was intended to 
address.
134
 
Perhaps for these reasons, it was not too long ago that a leading 
treatise declared that the puffery defense had ―all but gone the way of 
the dodo.‖135 In addition to the inappropriateness of favoring a 
doctrine rooted in caveat emptor, this apparent disappearance made 
sense because the puffery defense was grounded on two additional 
underlying assumptions rarely applicable in typical 10b-5 actions: (1) 
―that the parties are on equal footing, with equal access to 
information,‖ and (2) ―that the purchaser has no reason to trust a 
seller‘s sales talk.‖136 However, the puffery defense has since made a 
Phoenix-like return in spite of these concerns.
137
 
c) Ignoring the Total Mix 
Courts generally ignore context when applying the puffery 
doctrine, contrary to the ―total mix‖ aspect of the definition of 
materiality. For example, Jennifer O‘Hare has noted that in applying 
the puffery defense in securities litigation ―courts have improperly 
limited their focus to the words or language of the company‘s 
statement, while ignoring such important factors as who made the 
statement and where the statement was made.‖138 This is in stark 
contrast to the bespeaks-caution doctrine
139
 (discussed in more detail 
below), which immunizes otherwise material forward-looking 
                                                                                                                 
132 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
133 Id. at 186. 
134 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (―The evil addressed was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, to ‗puff,‘ and 
sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing 
corporation.‖). 
135 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3424 (3d ed. 1991). 
136 O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1705. 
137 See 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 135, at 3424 (―[A]las, however, the puffing 
concept in the securities context, which for decades had all but gone the way of the dodo, has 
recently experienced a revival.‖ (footnote omitted)); O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1698 (―More 
recently . . . courts have extended the protections of the puffery defense to non-broker 
defendants, such as corporate officers and directors.‖). 
138 O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1700 (emphasis in original); cf. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093 (1991) (―[C]onclusory terms in a commercial context are 
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate, the absence of 
which renders them misleading.‖), quoted in United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 553 (5th 
Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
139 See discussion infra Parts II.E.2. 
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misstatements by relying on the fact that they were presented in the 
context of meaningful cautionary language. As Professors Bainbridge 
and Gulati have noted: ―If putting the statement into context lends 
credence to a decision to dismiss, the bespeaks caution doctrine is 
invoked. If taking a statement out of context makes dismissal more 
plausible, however, puffery is invoked.‖140 
d) Contradicted by Market Realities 
Finally, both experimental literature and the prevalence of puffery 
in the marketplace belie the conclusion that puffery is immaterial. For 
example, David Hoffman has noted, ―[e]xperimental literature 
analyzing puffery confirms that individuals are unable to ignore 
vague optimism and expressions of confidence.‖141 Meanwhile, 
Professors Bainbridge and Gulati properly do not ignore the fact that 
―[a]necdotally, it does not take much time watching investment 
programs on television to notice that even quite vague statements of 
optimism by corporate managers are considered important by the 
investment news media.‖142 When ―a major factor in determining 
whether information [is] material is the importance attached to it by 
those who knew about it,‖ then the fact that those who market their 
companies rely so much on puffery patently contradicts the assertion 
that puffery is immaterial.
143
 
Some have argued that puffery deserves to be protected because it 
is shareholder-friendly. In other words, do shareholders really want 
management to forego the sales talk?
144
 As the court in Eisenstadt v. 
Centel Corp.
145
 noted: ―Where puffing is the order of the day, literal 
truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of 
letters of recommendation well know.‖146 However, the Supreme 
Court responded to similar concerns in Basic by concluding that 
―creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a 
prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because complying with the 
                                                                                                                 
140 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 123. 
141 Hoffman, supra note 45, at 587.  
142 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 120. 
143 SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997). 
144 See Larry Ribstein, The Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Prosecution: Spin or Fraud?, 
IDEOBLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/10/the-bear-
stearns-hedge-fund-prosecution-spin-or-fraud.html (―[I]mposing criminal liability for spin could 
encourage misleadingly pessimistic disclosures that end up hurting rather than helping 
investors.‖). 
145 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997). 
146 Id. at 746. 
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regulation might be ‗bad for business,‘ is a role for Congress, not this 
Court.‖147 
Having discussed a variety of the objections to the puffery 
doctrine, I will now turn to the other three materiality safety valves I 
have previously identified. 
2. Bespeaks Caution: Contrary to the Admonition  
Against Bright-Line Rules 
The goal of thwarting frivolous litigation has been deemed to be so 
lofty that under the express terms of the PSLRA a defendant could 
rely on the codified bespeaks-caution doctrine even where the 
plaintiff proved that the challenged statement ―was made with actual 
knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading.‖148 As 
mentioned above, the fact that this doctrine—at least as codified 
under the PSLRA (and as interpreted by at least some courts)—can be 
used to immunize knowingly false statements issued with the intent to 
defraud seemingly makes a mockery of ―investor protection‖ under 
the securities laws. Furthermore, the very concept of cautionary 
statements making forward-looking statements immaterial is arguably 
facially incoherent.
149
  
Of course, one can argue that this is the price that investors must 
pay in order to encourage corporations to issue the forward-looking 
statements so valued by the market. And indeed, the history leading 
up to codification of the bespeaks-caution doctrine suggests this is, at 
least partly, the case.
150
 However, even if one accepts the need for 
some type of safe-harbor provision in this area, the bespeaks-caution 
doctrine as currently applied arguably functions very much like a 
bright-line rule.
151
 At the very least, such an application of the 
                                                                                                                 
147 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.17 (1988). 
148 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
149 See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 588 (―Courts assume that individuals can hear a source 
saying two things—‗I express the following beliefs about the future‘ and ‗Don‘t rely on 
anything I just said‘—and make a rational decision about which statement is worthy of 
credence. This is nonsense.‖). See also Heminway, supra note 51, at 305 (―[T]he bespeaks 
caution defense exists because a reasonable (sophisticated) investor would not find forward-
looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language (1) important to her 
investment decision making or (2) significant to the total mix of available information.‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
150 See Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Safe Harbors: Historical and Current 
Approaches To Future Forecasting, 22 J. CORP. L. 661, 664–65 (1997) (noting that ―[i]n the 
early 1970s, the SEC reversed its position prohibiting submission of forward-looking 
information,‖ but that it soon saw the need to provide a safe harbor to encourage disclosure). 
151 See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 586 (―Over time, as I have explored, courts have 
become more willing to apply ‗puffery‘ and ‗bespeaks caution‘ doctrines which are (1) bright-
line rules that focus on the language of disclosures . . . .‖); id. at 588 (―Notably, both doctrines 
create incentives for corporations to use words that they hope will induce reliance, but which 
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doctrine runs counter to the Supreme Court‘s admonition that bright-
line rules are an anathema to the fact-intensive analysis of 
materiality.
152
  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore alternative 
formulations of the bespeaks-caution doctrine that might run less 
afoul of the Supreme Court‘s rejection of bright-line rules, or be less 
objectionable in terms of immunizing deceit. It is, however, very 
much within the scope of this Article to suggest that such concerns 
support relying on some other ground (e.g., scienter) to dismiss 
unmeritorious suits whenever possible.  
3. Truth-on-the-Market: The Misplaced Materiality Defense 
The truth-on-the-market doctrine is primarily a doctrine designed 
to allow a defendant to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance. As the Supreme Court noted in Basic, proving that the 
market makers ―were privy to the truth‖ may rebut the ―presumption 
of reliance‖ in a fraud-on-the-market case.153 Nonetheless, some 
courts have also used it to find alleged misstatements immaterial as a 
matter of law. For example, the Second Circuit, in Ganino v. Citizens 
Utilities Co.,
154
 opined, ―Under this [truth-on-the-market] corollary, a 
misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is already known to 
the market because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the 
market.‖155  
When so utilized, the truth-on-the-market doctrine, like the 
bespeaks-caution doctrine, has its roots in the total-mix definition of 
materiality.
156
 For example, in In re Merck & Co., Securities 
Litigation,
157
 the Third Circuit held that failure to disclose the bottom-
line impact of financial misstatements was immaterial as a matter of 
law where the data to calculate the bottom was disclosed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
may be rendered legally irrelevant; they are bright-line rules that enable fraud.‖). 
152 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (noting that while the bright-line rule ―seems to be directed 
solely at the comfort of corporate managers . . . ease of application alone is not an excuse for 
ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts‖); id. (―Any approach that designates a single fact 
or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, 
must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.‖). 
153 Id. at 248. 
154 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 
155 Id. at 167 (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996); Associated 
Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 213–14 (7th Cir. 
1993)). 
156 See Padfield, supra note 87, at 934 (―[U]nder the total mix of information analysis, 
public availability of the truth may offset a misleading disclosure.‖). 
157 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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investors.
158
 The court, however, noted the interplay of materiality 
and fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which is only 
available in the case of efficient markets: ―If these analysts—all 
focused on revenue—were unable for two months to make a handful 
of calculations, how can we presume an efficient market at all?‖159 
Given the problem of overdependence on materiality discussed in this 
Article, hopefully the courts will keep the truth-on-the-market 
doctrine where it belongs—in their analysis of reliance.160 Of course, 
dismissing a case for lack of reliance does not completely solve the 
―condoning deceit‖ problem because the court could still be 
dismissing an action where plaintiff has proven a misstatement of 
material fact made with intent to deceive.
161
 Nonetheless, I submit 
that telling plaintiffs that they did not rely on materially misleading 
statements arguably negatively impacts investor trust in the market 
less than telling them they were unreasonable for considering 
managerial statements important.
162
 
4. Bright-Line Price Movement 
Finally, courts that have the ―‗clearest commitments‘‖163 to the 
efficient-market hypothesis have often extended that hypothesis to 
conclude that ―the materiality of disclosed information may be 
measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period 
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm‘s stock.‖164 
This bright-line price-movement rule is also not without its critics. To 
begin with, as noted above, the Supreme Court specifically cautioned 
                                                                                                                 
158 Id. at 270–71. See generally Padfield, supra note 87, at 928–29 (arguing that the 
―Simple Math‖ rule applied in Merck should be replaced by a ―Reasonably Available Data‖ 
rule). 
159 In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 270. 
160 Cf. Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2001) (―While we agree 
with Burlington and the district court as to the requirement, in cases depending on the fraud-on-
the-market theory, that the complained of misrepresentation or omission have actually affected 
the market price of the stock, we conclude that it is more appropriate in such cases to relate this 
requirement to reliance rather than to materiality. That is how both Basic and Abell approach the 
matter.‖).  
161 Cf. Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to 
Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and 
Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 334 (2010) (―The poor reasoning by the 
Stoneridge majority—that fraud calculated to mislead the certifying accountants was too remote 
to meet § 10(b)‘s reliance requirement—appears to be driven by the eagerness to create what the 
majority incorrectly perceives as a ‗pro-business‘ rule to discourage litigation.‖). 
162 The same may be said of some of the other alternative grounds for dismissal suggested 
below, such as loss causation. 
163 In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 269 (quoting Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 886 (1998)). 
164 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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against the use of bright-line rules in making materiality 
determinations when it stated, ―[a]ny approach that designates a 
single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently 
fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be 
overinclusive or underinclusive.‖165 As I noted in an earlier article, 
allegiance to this bright-line price-movement rule led the Third 
Circuit to effectively conclude that ―an article appearing on the front 
page of the [Wall Street] Journal‘s ‗Money & Investing‘ section (in 
the popular ‗Heard on the Street‘ column) was not news,‖166 because 
the disclosed information had been disseminated earlier and the 
relevant stock price did not move (though it did in response to the 
Journal‘s article).167 
The bright-line price-movement test of materiality also relies 
heavily on event studies. As James Park describes:  
In securities class actions, litigants often rely upon event 
studies in arguing whether a misstatement is material. An 
event study measures the stock market‘s reaction to a piece of 
news by comparing the change in a company‘s stock price 
with its average return or the market‘s average return over a 
time period. To the extent that the company‘s stock price 
diverges from normal market movements in a statistically 
significant way, there is an abnormal return that can be 
attributed to the tested event.
168
 
However, these event studies are themselves the subject of much 
criticism. At least one study has concluded that ―the standard 
approach is plagued by systematic, downward bias . . . . As an 
empirical matter, then, use of the standard approach can be expected 
to lead to substantial anti-plaintiff bias in securities litigation . . . .‖169 
Furthermore, evidence of market price reaction may be delayed in 
ways that make overdependence on price movement suspect for 
purposes of determining materiality.
170
 It is this problem of ―noise‖ 
                                                                                                                 
165 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988); see also No. 84 Emp‘r-Teamster 
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(―Pursuant to Basic, we reject Defendants‘ argument for adoption of a bright-line rule requiring 
an immediate market reaction. The market is subject to distortions that prevent the ideal of ‗a 
free and open public market‘ from occurring.‖ (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246)). 
166 Padfield, supra note 87, at 957. 
167 See id. (discussing In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 270).  
168 James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 
513, 533 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
169 Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies 
(Claremont McKenna Coll., Robert Day Sch. of Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 2009-17, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442222.  
170 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 324 (―Exposure of a company‘s accounting woes, for 
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surrounding stock price movement that limits the argument that if 
there is no impact on the price of a security, then there are no 
damages.
171
  
One scholar has even argued the growing dependence on event 
studies in securities fraud suits could constitute a violation of the 
Seventh Amendment: 
The interrelated questions of materiality, reliance, loss 
causation, and damages all require an event study for their 
resolution. . . . As such, a defrauded investor who fails to 
offer a reliable event study performed by a qualified expert 
has little chance of prevailing. The dispositive role now 
played by event studies, however, is inconsistent with the 
Seventh Amendment and the federal securities laws. Rather, 
an event study requirement poses an unconstitutional and 
unwarranted barrier to meritorious securities fraud suits.
172
  
Finally, overdependence on stock price movement may also 
incentivize insiders to disclose information to the market in a way that 
minimizes their risk of liability at the expense of market efficiency.
173
 
In this age of fragile investor trust, courts should be very hesitant to 
encourage this kind of behavior. 
Having discussed various doctrinal, as well as practical, problems 
associated with the materiality safety valves, I turn now to the issue of 
conflict with the SEC‘s disclosure rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 
example, may not occur until after it has been acquired by another company and its stock is no 
longer publicly traded. Or fraud may occur in connection with the sale of a security for which 
there is no public market. More commonly, market data is available in some form but is difficult 
to interpret. Further, by the time information is disclosed by an issuer, it may have leaked into 
the market from another source, or subsequent events may have rendered it stale and therefore 
unimportant to investors.‖). 
171 Cf. 3 HAZEN, supra note 20 § 12.9[3][C] (―Although the absence of an impact on the 
market price certainly will make it more difficult to prove materiality, it should not be an 
absolute bar to a finding of materiality.‖). 
172 Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive 
Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 187 (2009); 
cf. John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 613, 672 (2008) (―Along with the Court‘s desire to curb excessive discovery in 
securities litigation, the Court also sought to assuage concerns about the pleading standard‘s 
impact on the Seventh Amendment.‖). 
173 See Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorneys Review the Supreme Court’s Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 
37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2005) (―[S]ecurities-fraud perpetrators could just as easily ‗walk 
down‘ the stock price by the selective disclosure of seemingly unrelated ‗bad‘ news concerning 
the company and thereby avoid a sudden stock-price reaction, and insulate themselves from 
liability.‖). 
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C. Excessive Characterization of Disclosures as Immaterial  
Creates Conflicts with Disclosure Regime 
The disclosure requirements under our securities laws have been 
described as involving ―a delicate and complex balancing act‖ 
between requiring too much and too little disclosure, with the ―legal 
concept of materiality provid[ing] the dividing line.‖174 In fact, 
Thomas Hazen has gone so far as to say that ―the hallmark of 
disclosure for both the 1933 Act registration statement and all 1934 
Act filings is embodied in the concept of ‗materiality.‘‖175 For 
example, Regulation S-K, Item 303, which provides instructions for 
the ―Management‘s Discussion and Analysis‖ section of an issuer‘s 
registration statement, references the concept of materiality in guiding 
disclosure on liquidity, capital resources, results of operations and 
off-balance sheet arrangements.
176
 The Commission has even 
promulgated a ―catch all‖ disclosure rule that turns on materiality: ―In 
addition to the information expressly required to be included in a 
statement or report, there shall be added such further material 
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required 
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are 
made not misleading.‖177 
This dependence on materiality in regulating disclosure appears 
only to be increasing. For example, Regulation Fair Disclosure, 
promulgated in 2000, prohibits companies registered under the 
Exchange Act from selectively disclosing material information to 
certain market professionals.
178
 And the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002
179
 requires registered companies to disclose ―all material off-
balance sheet transactions . . . that may have a material current or 
future effect‖ on the issuer‘s financial condition or results of 
operations.
180
 Even more recently, on August 8, 2008, the Advisory 
                                                                                                                 
174 Sauer, supra note 30, at 317; see also id. at 318 (―Except for those disclosure items 
specifically required by regulatory fiat, public companies need not disclose information that 
does not cross the threshold of materiality.‖). But see id. at 320 n.12 (―There are, however, 
many disclosure provisions that are not subject to materiality requirements, including the ‗books 
and records‘ and ‗internal controls‘ provisions [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].‖). 
175 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4[2] (6th ed. 2009). 
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2010). 
177 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2010). 
178 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2010); see also Laura S. Unger, Comm‘r, Special Study: 
Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM‘N (Dec. 2001), http://www. 
sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (―[L]iability under Reg. FD hinges on the element of 
materiality.‖). 
179 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 
29 U.S.C.). 
180 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2006). 
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Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting rendered its final 
report to the SEC, in which it stated, among other things:  
The FASB or the SEC, as appropriate, should supplement 
existing guidance to reinforce the following concepts:  
 Those who evaluate the materiality of an error should 
make the decision based upon the perspective of a reasonable 
investor[;]  
 Materiality should be judged based on how an error 
affects the total mix of information available to a reasonable 
investor, including through a consideration of qualitative and 
quantitative factors.
181
  
It is also worth noting that the definition of materiality also 
impacts ―gatekeepers‖ like accountants in carrying out their duties. 
For example, section 10A of the Exchange Act requires covered 
auditors to employ ―procedures designed to provide reasonable 
assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and 
material effect on the determination of financial statement 
amounts.‖182 Similarly, attorneys are subject to a congressional 
mandate to ―report evidence of a material violation of securities 
law . . . by the company or any agent thereof.‖183 
To the extent that courts routinely find disclosure immaterial on 
the basis of safety-valve doctrines that twist the definition of 
materiality to the breaking point, they weaken the effectiveness of 
these rules by creating unnecessary confusion about the definition of 
materiality.
184
 By relying more on grounds other than materiality to 
                                                                                                                 
181 ADVISORY COMM. ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FIN. REPORTING, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM‘N, FINAL REPORT 80 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/acifr/ 
acifr-finalreport.pdf (setting forth numerous points regarding ―materiality‖ and what is 
―material‖). 
182 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006); see, e.g., In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 
50,564, 83 SEC Docket 3052 (Oct. 20, 2004) (―KPMG auditors‘ materiality determinations 
were unreasonable in that they only considered quantitative materiality . . . and failed to also 
consider qualitative materiality.‖). 
183 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6303 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) 
(―The final rule does not define the word ‗material,‘ because that term has a well-established 
meaning under the federal securities laws and the Commission intends for that same meaning to 
apply here.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
184 Cf. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate 
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 186 n.218 (2005) 
(―As part of 10K annual reports, public entities are required to disclose all ‗material‘ events in 
the life of the business that may impact a shareholder‘s investment in the entity. The definition 
of materiality, however, is in flux and much discretion regarding whether an event is ‗material‘ 
for disclosure purposes remains with the company engaging in the disclosures.‖). 
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dismiss securities claims, the courts can continue to release the 
pressure created by frivolous suits while at the same time arguably 
allowing the definition of materiality for purposes of up-front 
disclosure decisions to suffer less distortion. Of course, this is all a 
matter of degree. And it is not my purpose here to argue that courts 
should never dismiss on the basis of immateriality. There may be any 
number of cases where judicial resolution of an issue of materiality 
will help, rather than hinder, effective application of the disclosure 
rules. But the seemingly almost indiscriminate application of safety-
valve doctrines like puffery is unnecessary in these days of 
heightened pleading standards, etc., and is likely to unduly water 
down the materiality standard.
185
 
IV. THE SOLUTION: SHIFT FOCUS TO  
OTHER ELEMENTS OF RULE 10B-5 
A. Dependence on Materiality Unnecessary 
At the same time that excessive application of the materiality 
safety valves is arguably causing problems, it is highly unlikely that 
courts could not have dismissed most of these cases on some other 
basis. In the following sections I hope to show that with today‘s 
heightened pleading standards and recent Supreme Court decisions on 
the issues of scienter and loss causation, there is simply no need to 
lean on materiality as heavily as in the early days following Basic. 
Add to that the challenges plaintiffs face from market efficiency 
arguments, the particular limitations on the liability of secondary 
actor defendants, statutes of limitations, and the possibility of 
sanctions, and it should be the rare case where a pretrial materiality 
determination is necessary to stop a strike suit from going forward.
186
 
Securities lawsuits filed in the wake of the financial crisis will 
                                                                                                                 
185 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 565, 586 (citing the theory that higher rates of judicial 
immateriality findings ―reduce disclosure pressures,‖ but concluding that their purpose is to 
change investor behavior). 
186 For example, in the class action context courts now have many acceptable ways to get 
―dirty‖ with the facts without having to do an end run around Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156 (1974), via a pretrial inquiry into materiality. See id. at 177 (―We find nothing in either 
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class 
action.‖). See generally Patricia Groot, Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen 
Through In re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1143–44 (2009) (―Since the early 1980s, opposing 
attorneys have used Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest 
v. Falcon to battle over the proper class certification process in securities class action lawsuits.‖ 
(footnotes omitted)). My thanks to Professor James D. Cox for this particular perspective on 
what courts were likely doing, at least in part, when they developed their overdependence on the 
pretrial materiality inquiry. 
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certainly raise materiality issues but, as is almost always the case, 
many of the other elements of Rule 10b-5 will be up for grabs as well. 
For example, as Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha note, while investors 
will likely have little problem identifying significant price drops 
associated with certain disclosures connected to the downturn in the 
real estate market, 
[T]he existence of such a statistically significant and 
substantial negative price reaction is hardly the end of the 
analysis necessary to assess the claim that investor losses 
attributable to this price reaction result in recoverable 
damages. There are still the questions of whether, and if so 
when, disclosure deficiencies by financial institutions 
occurred, whether the requisite scienter associated with these 
disclosure deficiencies existed, and whether investor losses 
are attributable to these disclosure deficiencies (this last issue 
being the requirement of loss causation in Rule 10b-5 causes 
of action).
187
 
B. Scienter 
The most likely candidate for replacing materiality as the safety 
valve of choice is scienter.
188
 Following passage of the PSLRA, a 
securities class-action plaintiff must plead particular facts giving rise 
to a strong inference that the speaker acted with the requisite intent to 
defraud, or at least acted recklessly in the face of knowledge that his 
or her misrepresentation would be traded on by investors.
189
 In 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
190
 the Supreme Court 
further clarified that ―[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a 
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from 
the facts alleged.‖191 Given that little serious discovery has taken 
                                                                                                                 
187 Ferrell & Saha, supra note 27, at 97–98. 
188 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that no ―private 
cause of action for damages will lie under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any 
allegation of ‗scienter‘—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud‖). 
189 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); see also Tracy Bishop Holton, Stating Causes of 
Action for Securities Fraud Under the Private Securities Law Reform Act of 1995, in 26 CAUSES 
OF ACTION 109, 126–27 (Clark Kimball, ed., 2d ed. 2004) (―The Ninth Circuit now employs the 
most stringent standard for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, holding that reckless conduct, 
following the enactment of the PSLRA, only suffices to plead scienter if it rises to the level of 
‗deliberate recklessness.‘ The First, Third, and Sixth Circuits in contrast apply a more relaxed 
standard, concluding that recklessness suffices to meet the scienter requirement.‖ (citation 
omitted)). 
190 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
191 Id. at 324; cf. N. PETER RASMUSSEN, FRAUD LITIGATION AFTER DURA, STONERIDGE 
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place at the time of a motion to dismiss, and that the PSLRA actually 
stays discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, the bar 
for plaintiffs on this element is extremely high.
192
 I contend that 
dismissing a suit on the basis of scienter does much less harm to 
investor confidence than telling them that they are ―unreasonable‖ for 
putting stock in management statements concerning the well-being of 
their corporation. 
A recent subprime-related case helps illustrate this point. In In re 
Radian Securities Litigation,
193
 the court dismissed plaintiffs‘ claims 
that Radian had failed to adequately disclose its subprime exposure 
by concluding that the ―plaintiffs‘ allegations . . . do not establish 
either motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs therefore 
have not raised [the necessary] strong inference of scienter.‖194 The 
court went on to note: 
Even if these allegations were sufficient to establish either 
motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness, however, the Court also concludes that an 
inference of scienter with respect to the plaintiffs‘ allegations 
is neither cogent nor at least as compelling as the plausible 
opposing inferences suggested by the defendants.
195
 
Certainly, pleading scienter is not a completely insurmountable 
obstacle. ―[R]ecent circuit court cases have reached different 
conclusions on the question of whether an inference may be drawn 
                                                                                                                 
 
AND TELLABS: SWIMMING UPSTREAM? 8 (2008), available at http://business.cch.com/securities 
Law/news/12-11-08a.pdf (―In some circuits, the Tellabs [decision] actually lowered the 
pleading standard.‖).  
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (―In any private action arising under this 
chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion 
to dismiss . . . .‖); cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (discussing ways 
for shareholders to gain information prediscovery using various ―tools at hand‖ like publicly 
available sources and access to books and records), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
193 612 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
194 Id. at 608. 
195 Id.; see also In re PMI Group Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. C 08-1405 SI, C 08-1406 SI, 2009 
WL 1916934, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (finding that complaint sufficiently alleged 
material misrepresentations related to subprime exposure, as well as loss causation, but granting 
motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead scienter). But see In re Downey Sec. Litig., No. 
CV 08-3261-JFW (RZx), 2009 WL 736802 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (dismissing subprime 
securities suit on basis of lack of scienter, but also ruling in favor of defendants on materiality, 
loss causation and lack of misrepresentation); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-4451, 2009 
WL 1619636 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1999) (dismissing securities claim for failure to plead scienter, 
but also opining on the puffery and bespeaks-caution defenses). 
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that senior management must be aware of matters involving the 
company‘s ‗core operations‘ . . . .‖196 In addition, ―‗collective 
scienter‘ may be actionable in the absence of a sufficient inference of 
scienter attributable to a particular individual.‖ 197 Plaintiffs may also 
still be able to rely on confidential witnesses in at least some 
jurisdictions.
198
 Pleading motive and opportunity may also remain 
sufficient, at least in some jurisdictions.
199
 There also may be some 
push back from Congress against what at least some see as an 
excessively business-friendly securities regulation regime.
200
 
Regardless, it does appear that the extent to which taking on 
additional risk during a financial bubble may constitute evidence of 
recklessness will be an issue in litigation arising out of the financial 
crisis.
 201
 
                                                                                                                 
196 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2. 
197 Id.; see also Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2009) (―While most courts have rejected the 
collective scienter theory, a handful of courts have permitted some derivation of collective 
scienter.‖). 
198 Compare Higginbotham v. Baxter Int‘l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(―One upshot of the approach that Tellabs announced is that we must discount allegations that 
the complaint attributes to five ‗confidential witnesses‘ . . . . It is hard to see how information 
from anonymous sources could be deemed ‗compelling‘ or how we could take account of 
plausible opposing inferences.‖), with In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 
323, 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (―However, several district courts in this circuit have considered 
allegations based on confidential sources after Tellabs without discounting them.‖). 
199 See Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 n.51 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(―The Second Circuit has continued to treat motive and opportunity allegations as a separate 
category, but it does not appear to have explicitly examined whether that practice is consistent 
with Tellabs.‖). 
200 See J. Robert Brown, Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009: Repealing 
the PSLRA, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 28, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theraceto 
thebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/restoring-american-financial-stability-act-of-2009-
repealing.html (discussing proposed American Financial Stability Act). 
201 Cf. In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 269–70 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (―We also find that a reasonable person would deem plaintiffs‘ inference of scienter ‗at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.‘ 
Defendants argue in their submissions that Ambac‘s financial woes were caused by the global 
economic collapse and that this is a ‗fraud by hindsight‘ case. . . . [However, t]he conduct that 
plaintiffs allege, if true, would make Ambac an active participant in the collapse of their own 
business, and of the financial markets in general, rather than merely a passive victim.‖ (citation 
omitted) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007))); 
Kevin LaCroix, Ambac Financial Subprime Securities Suit Dismissal Motions Substantially 
Denied, THE D & O DIARY (Feb. 23, 2010) http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/02/articles/ 
subprime-litigation/ambac-financial-subprime-securities-suit-dismissal-motions-substantially-
denied (―[R]ejecting the ‗hey, the whole economy tanked‘ argument is important. There are a 
number of companies about whom it might be alleged, as was alleged here of Ambac, that they 
were ‗an active participant in the collapse of their own business, and of the financial markets in 
general, rather than merely a passive victim.‘‖). But see Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 
758, 776 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010) (―We emphasize that under the [forward-looking statement] 
statutory safe harbor, the plaintiffs must show more than recklessness—an objective inquiry—
they must show actual subjective knowledge.‖).  
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The conclusion of a recent review of subprime litigation is a great 
example of why focusing on scienter rather than materiality may be 
preferable. As Jonathan Eisenberg points out, scienter ―turns out to be 
the perfect predictor of outcomes across all 16 cases‖ reviewed.202 As 
Kevin LaCroix summarizes, ―If plaintiffs were not relying on claims 
that required pleading scienter (i.e., the ‘33 Act claims) or convinced 
the court that the scienter allegations were sufficient, they survived 
the motion to dismiss.‖203 Furthermore, ―in the Section 10(b) cases in 
which the plaintiffs met the standard for pleading scienter, ‗they also 
convinced the court to reject the merits of the other defenses asserted 
in the motion to dismiss.‘‖204 
C. Loss Causation 
Loss causation can also often offer a sound basis for dismissing a 
frivolous suit without making a materiality determination.
205
 As 
mentioned earlier, while it is true that the remaining alternative 
grounds for dismissing frivolous suits do not perfectly address the 
―condoning lies‖ problem like relying on scienter does, it seems fair 
to argue that in terms of restoring investor trust, a judicial 
pronouncement that, for example, ―you cannot prove your loss was 
caused by the lie‖ is still better than ―the lie is unimportant.‖  
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
206
 the Supreme Court 
held that it was ―Congress‘ intent to permit private securities fraud 
actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately 
allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.‖207 
While the precise meaning of Dura continues to be contested,
208
 it is 
fair to say generally that in order to successfully carry their burden on 
loss causation, plaintiffs must do more than merely allege an 
artificially inflated stock price and subsequent loss—the connection 
                                                                                                                 
202 Jonathan Eisenberg, Subprime Securities Class Action Decisions: Who’s Winning, 
Who’s Losing and Why?, BLOOMBERG L. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=1962 . 
203 Kevin LaCroix, Who’s Winning and Who’s Losing the Dismissal Motions in Subprime 
Securities Suits?, The D & O DIARY (Jan. 15, 2010, 4:36 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/ 
2010/01/articles/subprime-litigation/whos-winning-and-whos-losing-the-dismissal-motions-in-
subprime-securities-suits.  
204 Id. (citing Eisenberg, supra note 202).  
205 See Jonathan C. Dickey et al., Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Where Do We 
Go From Here?, 22 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2, 7 (Apr. 2008) (citing loss causation 
as one of ―key defenses‖). 
206 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
207 Id. at 346. 
208 See, e.g., T. Gorman, Part IV: Pleading Requirements Under Dura—A Circuit Split, 
SEC ACTIONS (July 30, 2009, 11:35 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=1350 (―Following the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Dura, the circuit courts have adopted two and perhaps three 
positions on pleading loss causation.‖). 
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between the two must be made express.
209
 ―Following Dura, pleading 
loss causation often has evolved into ‗minitrials‘ at very early stages 
in the proceedings, and plaintiffs are expected to present expert 
testimony that specifically links the alleged fraud to the financial 
losses.‖210 
Failure to plead loss causation can be a particularly powerful 
defense in a market where overall stock prices have fallen rapidly in 
response to the recent crisis.
211
 As N. Peter Rasmussen notes, this is 
so because ―investors can find it difficult to attribute stock price 
declines to company-specific fraud rather than general market 
conditions.‖212 As the Tenth Circuit stated in In re Williams Securities 
Litigation–WCG Subclass,213 ―[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of 
showing that his losses were attributable to the revelation of the fraud 
and not the myriad other factors that affect a company‘s stock 
price.‖214 
The need to link the alleged misstatement to the loss arguably also 
permits issuers to time their corrective disclosures in such a way as to 
make loss causation all the more difficult to prove. As the Fifth 
Circuit stated in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance 
Telecom, Inc.,
215
 ―when unrelated negative statements are announced 
                                                                                                                 
209 Cf. id. (discussing the several pleading standards the circuit courts employ for a loss 
causation claim). 
210 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2. Cf. In re MIVA, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:05-cv-201-
FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 3821146, at **9–13 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (accepting magistrate 
judge‘s recommendation to grant the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment where the 
plaintiffs presented extensive expert analysis on the effect of nine alleged misstatements, but 
failed to specifically connect the two statements that survived dismissal to the loss). 
211 But cf. Steven J. Toll, Coming to Terms with Loss Causation after Dura: A Response to 
Professors Partnoy, Ferrell, and Saha, 35 J. CORP. L. 189, 189 (2009) (arguing that loss 
causation presents no great obstacle to plaintiffs); Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Does Dura Matter? 
Loss Causation and the Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo 2 (July 31, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442026 (suggesting that Dura 
will not have much of an effect). 
212 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, Subprime-Related 
Securities Litigation: An Interim Update, THE D & O DIARY (Sep. 9, 2009), http://www.dando 
diary.com/2009/09/articles/subprime-litigation/subprimerelated-securities-litigation-an-interim-
update (―[I]n both the lawsuit that Luminent Mortgage Corporation filed against Merrill Lynch 
and in the First Marblehead subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, the courts quoted 
with approval language from a prior RICO case in which the Second Circuit said ‗when the 
plaintiff‘s loss coincides with a market-wide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other 
investors, the prospect that plaintiffs‘ loss was caused by fraud decreases.‘‖). 
213 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
214 Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). But see J. Robert Brown, Using Loss Causation to Repeal 
Rule 10b-5: In re: Williams Securities Litigation (Part 5), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 
24, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/using-loss-causation-
to-repeal-rule-10b-5-in-re-williams-sec-3.html (―The impact of Williams is to make it harder to 
bring meritorious fraud suits. It is an approach not required by the antifraud provisions and not 
required by Dura. It is consistent with the position of this Blog that the new administration may 
discover that the biggest obstacle to reform lies not in Congress but in the courts.‖). 
215 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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contemporaneous of a corrective disclosure, the plaintiff must prove 
‗that it is more probable than not that it was this negative statement, 
and not other unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant 
amount of the decline.‘‖216 Thus, we should not be surprised if these 
type of ―mixed message‖ cases routinely crop up for dismissal. 
To be sure, as with other elements of Rule 10b-5, there remain 
unsettled questions about what is required to effectively plead loss 
causation. Some courts may resolve this current uncertainty in a 
plaintiff-friendly manner.
217
 In addition, further clarification will 
likely also come from the Supreme Court sooner or later and there is 
at least some chance (however small) that subsequent Supreme Court 
rulings will lessen the burdens on plaintiffs in terms of pleading loss 
causation.
218
 For the time being, however, failure to plead loss 
causation appears to be a strong defense.  
Of course, as with other alternatives, the fact that loss causation 
can effectively serve the safety valve role is of little worth vis-à-vis 
the issues discussed herein if courts continue to dismiss on the basis 
of loss causation and materiality. For example, in another subprime-
related case, In re Downey Securities Litigation,
219
 the court 
dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claims on the basis of, among other things 
(including lack of scienter), failure to adequately plead loss 
causation.
220
 Unfortunately, the court in Downey also unnecessarily 
opined on the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations, 
concluding that statements affirming the company‘s ―strong‖ capital 
position were ―‗too vague to be actionable.‘‖221 The court‘s 
                                                                                                                 
216 Id. at 270 (quoting Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 
2004)). 
217 Cf. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam) (holding that the district court erroneously placed the burden of proving loss 
causation on the plaintiff at precertification stage). The court elaborated: ―To be successful, a 
securities class-action plaintiff must thread the eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over 
the years by judicial decree and congressional action. Those ever higher hurdles are not, 
however, intended to prevent viable securities actions from being brought.‖Id. 
218 See Nate Raymond, In 5th Circuit, Justice O’Connor Revives Flowserve Securities 
Class Action, LAW.COM (June 23, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id= 
1202431650631&Fifth_Circuit_Revives_Flowserve_Securities_Class_Action (―[T]he question 
of loss causation at the class certification stage seems headed to the Supreme Court, given the 
continuing controversy among the circuits on how to deal with loss causation in the wake of the 
Supreme Court‘s ruling in Dura Pharmaceuticals.‖); cf. N. Peter Rasmussen, 5th Circuit 
Remains Hostile to Securities Class Actions, JIM HAMILTON‘S WORLD SEC. REG. (Feb. 22, 
2010, 9:48 AM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/5th-circuit-remains-hostile-
to.html (―While all fraud plaintiffs must plead loss causation under the Supreme Court‘s Dura 
decision, they must prove loss causation in the 5th Circuit at the class certification stage.‖). 
219 No. CV 08-3261-JFW (RZx), 2009 WL 736802 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009). 
220 Id. at *14–15. 
221 Id. at *6 (quoting In re Calpine Corp. Sec. Lit., 288 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 
2003)). 
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conclusion that as a matter of law assurances of a ―strong‖ capital 
position are too vague to be actionable seems highly questionable and 
was, as is so often the case, unnecessary. 
D. Reliance and Rebutting the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption 
Reliance can also serve as its own safety valve. While defendants 
in many of the relevant cases face the presumption of reliance created 
under the fraud-on-the-market theory adopted in Basic, that 
presumption is rebuttable.
222
 As the Supreme Court said in Basic, 
―[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.‖223 For example, as 
discussed above, this is where the truth-on-the-market defense may 
properly be applied without creating the problems associated with 
dismissing claims on the basis of immateriality. The truth-on-the-
market defense should be particularly salient in current and pending 
subprime-related litigation because:  
Based on the global fact story that is emerging, it would seem 
that defendants in some of the cases will have powerful 
defenses to reliance based upon the publicly-disclosed facts 
concerning the downturn in the subprime market, and the 
copious risk factor disclosure that companies were 
publishing, and Wall Street analysts were writing about, 
during the time period of late 2006 through the summer of 
2007.
224
 
In addition, there may be cases where the market is in fact not 
efficient for purposes of applying the presumption.
225
 Finally, 
following the Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
226
 certain 
                                                                                                                 
222 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988); cf. 14 WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6864 
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003) (―While reliance in nondisclosure cases is presumed from materiality, 
affirmative evidence of nonreliance may defeat this presumption.‖). 
223 Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. 
224 Dickey, supra note 205, at 6. See also Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Early 
Trends, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/ 
SubprimeRelatedSecuritiesLitigationEarlyTrends.aspx (providing a general overview of trends 
in subprime-related securities litigation). 
225 See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285–87 (D.N.J. 1989) (setting forth 
five factors ―which, if alleged, might give rise to an inference that [the defendant‘s company] 
traded in an efficient market‖).  
226 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM 
188 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
defendants may be too far removed from the securities transaction for 
their actions to have been relied upon by plaintiffs.
227
 I will briefly 
address dismissal of secondary actors, pleading standards, statutes of 
limitations and sanctions in the following section. 
E. Dismissing Secondary Actors, Pleading Standards,  
Statutes of Limitations, and Sanctions 
Why rule on the materiality of certain misstatements if you can 
just dismiss the case because the defendants are not proper parties 
under Rule 10b-5? While ―[i]n many instances of significant financial 
fraud, issuers lack the resources to compensate harmed investors, and 
plaintiffs have turned to third-party defendants such as vendors, 
financial institutions and gatekeepers,‖ the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Stoneridge ―significantly narrowed the scope of actions against 
third-party defendants.‖228 In Stoneridge, the Court ―concluded that 
the private right of action did not reach suppliers, who entered into 
sham transactions with a cable operator, because investors in the 
cable company did not rely upon the suppliers‘ statements or 
representations.‖229 In other words, reliance may well be the critical 
element when dealing with secondary actors.
230
 Add to Stoneridge the 
Supreme Court‘s prior decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver,
231
 where the Court denied a private aiding 
and abetting claim under Rule 10b-5, and you have a meaningful 
barrier between plaintiffs and many of the parties they would like to 
sue.
232
 Both Stoneridge and Central Bank certainly have their 
                                                                                                                 
227 Id. at 166–67 (―In these circumstances the investors cannot be said to have relied upon 
any of respondents‘ deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the 
requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner under the implied 
right of action.‖). 
228 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2; cf. LaCroix, supra note 201 (―One of the 
characteristics of many of these subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits is the extent to which 
the plaintiffs are seeking to impose liability on the gatekeepers of the target companies.‖). 
229 Gail O‘Gradney, Recent Cases—Supreme Court: Secondary Actors Not Liable For 
Participation in Scheme Under § 10(b), 26-02 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER ARTICLE I (Feb. 
2008). 
230 See, e.g., Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting ―creator‖ standard and holding ―that a secondary actor can be held liable in a private 
damages action brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b) only for false statements attributed to the 
secondary-actor defendant at the time of dissemination. Absent attribution, plaintiffs cannot 
show that they relied on defendants‘ own false statements.‖ (footnote omitted)), reh’g and reh’g 
en banc denied, July 26, 2010; cf. id. at 160 (―[P]laintiffs‘ Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims for 
‗scheme liability‘ are foreclosed by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Stoneridge.‖).  
231 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
232 See Thomas O. Gorman, Dura and Iqbal, Two Decisions Having an Impact, SEC 
ACTIONS (Oct. 22, 2009, 2:42 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=1615 (―While the complaint 
alleges a series of misstatements, after the Supreme Court‘s decision in Central Bank of Denver 
. . . , there is no liability for aiding and abetting. Accordingly, the auditors can only be held 
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critics,
233
 and legislation has even been introduced seeking to overturn 
the decisions,
234
 but as of this writing, the decisions stand as another 
set of litigation safety valves—available in cases involving secondary 
actors—that do not require a court to opine on materiality.  
Turning to pleading standards, while the safety-valve role of 
heightened pleading standards has already been discussed in 
connection with pleading scienter and loss causation, recent Supreme 
Court decisions suggest heightened pleading standards may favor 
defendants in securities cases even may broadly. As Jonathan Tuttle 
explains: 
Since the 1995 passage of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (―PSLRA‖), defendants in civil securities class 
actions have focused their attacks on the adequacy of 
complaints on the PSLRA‘s stringent requirements for 
pleading scienter and the specificity requirements for 
pleading fraud found in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b). More 
recently, however, three Supreme Court decisions have 
breathed new life – and new force – into the general pleading 
standards of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a). These cases, Dura v. 
Broudo,
 
 Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
 
 
provide opportunities for defense lawyers to attack securities 
class action complaints on a much more basic level and create 
                                                                                                                 
 
liable, if at all, for misstatements or omissions they made.‖); cf. 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 27:58 (2009) (noting that there is disagreement as to the 
viability of group pleading both for purposes statement attribution and scienter). 
233 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 448–
49 (2009) (―Stoneridge . . . is worth academic discussion because it illustrates how utterly 
irrational the law governing private securities fraud actions has become.‖); Klock, supra note 
161, at 336 (―The result of the Court‘s holding creates moral hazard, whereby economic 
incentives to behave ethically are removed and positive economic incentives to engage in 
unethical conduct are created.‖).  
234 See J. Robert Brown, Overturning Stoneridge and the Symbolic Passing of an Era, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org 
/shareholder-rights/overturning-stoneridge-and-the-symbolic-passing-of-an-era.html (―[T]he 
2009 Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act (S. 1551) would authorize 
actions against ‗any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to 
another person in violation of‘ federal securities laws. . . . In introducing the Bill, Senator 
Specter specifically noted that it was intended to overrule both Stoneridge and Central Bank.‖); 
see also Crimmins, supra note 55 (―Section 929-O of the Act provides for the SEC to impose 
aiding and abetting liability on persons who ‗recklessly‘ provide substantial assistance to 
someone who violates the Exchange Act. . . . In addition, the Act provides, for the first time, for 
aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act, the Investment Company Act and the 
Investment Advisers Act. The Act . . . directs the GAO to study whether private plaintiffs 
should also be allowed to sue aiders and abettors.‖ (citations omitted)). 
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new obstacles for plaintiffs trying to survive a motion to 
dismiss.
235
 
The requirements in Dura for effectively pleading loss causation 
have already been discussed.
236
 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
237
 
the Court imposed a ―plausibility‖ standard for reviewing claims 
under the Sherman Act.
238
 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
239
 the Supreme Court 
extended the Twombly plausibility standard to all civil actions.
240
 At 
least one commentator has noted the possibility that courts may read 
Iqbal as imposing pleading requirements even more stringent than the 
PSLRA.
241
 Iqbal may also impact the pleading of loss causation in 
courts applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to Dura.
242
 At 
the very least, while much uncertainty about the implications of Iqbal 
exists, the strong negative response to the decision from at least some 
quarters suggests the decision should not be taken lightly.
243
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Turning to statutes of limitations, plaintiffs generally must bring a 
Rule 10b-5 claim within two years of discovery and five years of the 
violation.
244
 If plaintiffs‘ lawyers complain about it, there is a good 
chance defendants will want to rely upon it. Following the voluntary 
dismissal of McClellan v. Regions Financial Corporation,
245
 a 
subprime-related case, the attorney for the plaintiffs complained, 
―there‘s a problem with securities law time limits in cases like 
Regions, where subprime investments were concealed for years.‖246 
Certainly, time may often be on the side of defendants, particularly in 
the more complex corporate fraud cases.
247
 
Finally, if the real concern motivating dependence on materiality 
safety valves is frivolous litigation, courts may want to consider 
increasing (appropriately, of course) their use of sanctions. For 
example, attorneys for plaintiffs in the securities class action of In re 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. Securities 
Litigation
248
 were ordered to pay all the defendants‘ attorney fees 
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after failing to perform the necessary diligence to ensure a claim was 
proper, such failure rising in the eyes of the court to ―gross negligence 
bordering on recklessness.‖249 The PSLRA mandates judicial review 
for, and imposition of, sanctions for frivolous litigation.
250
  
V. CRITICISMS 
I want to briefly address some possible objections to my 
suggestion that courts reduce their dependence on materiality as a 
means to thwart frivolous suits because such dependence effectively 
and unnecessarily condones lying, twists the definition of materiality 
to the breaking point, and creates conflicts with the disclosure rules.  
One possible criticism is that a reduction in judicial ―guidance‖ on 
the issue of materiality would hurt more than it would help. One 
might respond to this argument, however, by pointing out that there is 
at least some evidence to suggest that ―the accumulated body of 
published case law provides limited guidance for decision-
making,‖251 suggesting that the loss would not be that great.  
Another possible criticism is that judicial ―leniency‖ in granting 
dismissals on the basis of materiality is necessary to offset the costs 
associated with the SEC‘s ―zealousness‖ in bringing cases and 
defining materiality in such a way as to provide maximum protection 
to the retail investor.
252
 Again, if cost is the issue, one may reply that 
the uncertainty associated with judicial materiality determinations is 
also costly.
253
 More importantly, I am not arguing that courts should 
give up their safety valve ―operator‖ function. Rather, I am arguing 
that they should stop depending on materiality as their primary tool 
whenever possible.
254
  
What about the argument that shifting the focus of Rule 10b-5 
claims to other elements will result in an increased cost for experts, 
since loss causation and reliance (for example) are often fact-
intensive issues? The answer is that courts are already engaging in 
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these analyses, likely to ensure that when the case is appealed there 
will be multiple grounds upon which to affirm. This actually suggests 
another cost of my approach—that is, the cost of some cases being 
reversed that might have been upheld had the alleged misstatement 
also been found to be immaterial. But, it is the rare case that is 
reversed but for materiality, and as to those cases where the issue 
does manifest, I believe the overall benefit of reducing judicial 
dependence on materiality should outweigh the cost. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts create a number of problems when they rely excessively on 
materiality in dismissing what they deem to be frivolous claims. First, 
the repeated immunization of lies both condones corporate deceit and 
mocks investor trust. Second, the various safety-valve doctrines 
conflict with the Supreme Court‘s guidance on the definition and 
analysis of materiality. Finally, the ―watering down‖ of materiality 
creates problems for those trying to determine what disclosures are 
required under the SEC‘s rules, which often mandate a materiality 
assessment. The time is right for courts to look to the other elements 
of Rule 10b-5 to dismiss claims they deem frivolous. This is so 
because satisfying those other elements has become more difficult 
since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Basic, and the current financial 
crisis provides both the need and opportunity to restore investor 
confidence by ceasing to call lies immaterial. 
 
